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Reprogramming Recidivism: The First Step Act and
Algorithmic Prediction of Risk
Amy B. Cyphert
The First Step Act, a seemingly miraculous bipartisan criminal justice
reform bill, was signed into law in late 2018. The Act directed the Attorney
General to develop a risk and needs assessment tool that would effectively
determine who would be eligible for early release based on an algorithmic
prediction of recidivism. The resulting tool—PATTERN—was released in
the summer of 2019 and quickly updated in January of 2020. It was
immediately put to use in an unexpected manner, helping to determine
who was eligible for early release during the COVID-19 pandemic. It is
now the latest in a growing list of algorithmic recidivism prediction tools,
tools that first came to mainstream notice with critical reporting about
the COMPAS sentencing algorithm.
This Article evaluates PATTERN, both in its development as well as
its still-evolving implementation. In some ways, the PATTERN algorithm
represents tentative steps in the right direction on issues like
transparency, public input, and use of dynamic factors. But PATTERN, like
many algorithmic decision-making tools, will have a disproportionate
impact on Black inmates; it provides fewer opportunities for inmates to
reduce their risk score than it claims and is still shrouded in some secrecy
due to the government’s decision to dismiss repeated calls to release more
information about it. Perhaps most perplexing, it is unclear whether the
tool actually advances accuracy with its predictions. This Article
concludes that PATTERN is a decent first step, but it still has a long way to
go before it is truly reformative.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 2018, President Trump signed into law the
federal First Step Act,1 a sweeping piece of criminal justice reform
legislation. It has been one of his favorite accomplishments to tout, and
he discussed it during the 2020 State of the Union address.2 The scope
of the Act was broad, addressing topics ranging from reducing racial
disparities in incarceration to shackling of pregnant inmates during
birth. The Act was supported overwhelmingly by Democrats and
Republicans and heralded as “almost miraculous”3 and “a major win for
the movement to end mass incarceration.”4 That Congress passed ANY
criminal justice reform was, in and of itself, remarkable—it had been
eight years since Congress had passed legislation on the topic, and even
that was relatively modest.5 The First Step Act’s passage was further
surprising given the administration at the time. There had been no
suggestion that criminal justice reform was a priority for the Trump
Administration,6 and indeed, the last meaningful criminal justice reform
1

See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
Matthew Charles, who President Trump described during the State of the Union
as “the very first person to be released from prison under the First Step Act,” attended
the speech as a guest. Mariah Timms, President Trump: ‘Welcome Home’ to Matthew
Charles, Man Released from Nashville Prison Under First Step Act, TENNESSEAN (Feb. 5,
2019, 8:37 PM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2019/02/05/donaldtrump-state-of-the-union-matthew-charles-alice-johnson-first-step-act-free/27835
45002.
3 Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System, 128 YALE
L.J.F. 791, 795 (2019).
4 Ames Grawert & Tim Lau, How the FIRST STEP Act Became Law—And What
Happens Next, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/
blog/how-first-step-act-became-law-and-what-happens-next.
5 The Fair Sentencing Reform Act of 2010 reduced the crack versus powder cocaine
disparity by increasing the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger mandatory
minimum sentencing from five grams to twenty-eight grams. Fair Sentencing Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.). Many commentators have argued that the Fair Sentencing
Reform Act did not adequately address the crack-to-powder disparity. See, e.g., Scott R.
Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to Congress’s One-Way Criminal Law
Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 449 (2011) (“After the FSA’s passage, some
argued that the bill did not go far enough in equalizing the sentences imposed for crack
and powder cocaine offenses. Others complained that the bill did not apply
retroactively, thus leaving those individuals sentenced for crack-based offenses prior to
the FSA’s enactment without relief.”). The First Step Act addresses the retroactive
application in Title IV.
6 See, e.g., Grawert & Lau, supra note 4, at 2 (“[W]hen Donald Trump was elected
president in 2016, many worried that sentencing reform would prove impossible for the
next four years. Trump’s position on criminal justice reform was unclear at best and
regressive at worse.”); Hopwood, supra note 3, at 797 (“After the 2016 election and the
appointment of Senator Jeff Sessions as Attorney General, most in the federal reform
community believed we would spend the next four years playing defense against the
2
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proposed legislation had been blocked by none other than the Attorney
General, Jeff Sessions, while he was in the Senate.7
The First Step Act embodied important prison reform goals,
including reducing the use of restraints on pregnant inmates;8
addressing the crack versus cocaine sentencing disparity;9 improving
reentry programs for those leaving prison;10 and streamlining the
process for placing incarcerated persons in prisons near their families.11
Given the breadth and importance of these initiatives, it is not surprising
that many criminal justice reform groups supported the Act’s passage.12
As of December 2019, 7,000 incarcerated persons had been released
under this Act.13
In the First Step Act, Congress directed the Attorney General to
develop a risk and needs assessment tool that could facilitate reducing
recidivism and would prioritize the early release of any inmates14 who
were found to pose a “minimum” or “low” risk of reoffending. As a
DOJ’s bad policy preferences and a Congress that frequently treats criminal law and
punishment as the only way to fix national social problems.”).
7 See Ames C. Grawert, Analysis: Sen. Jeff Sessions’s Record on Criminal Justice,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
research-reports/analysis-sen-jeff-sessionss-record-criminal-justice (noting that thenSenator Sessions had “personally blocked” a bipartisan criminal justice reform effort in
2016).
8 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 301, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018)
(prohibiting the use of restraints on inmates “during the period of pregnancy, labor, and
postpartum recovery” unless the inmate is a “flight risk”; poses a threat of harm to
herself or others; or the restraints are appropriate for the inmate’s medical safety)
9 See First Step Act § 404 (allowing courts to retroactively apply the Fair Sentencing
Reform Act of 2010).
10 First Step Act §§ 502–05 (providing federal grants for the improvement of existing
adult and juvenile reentry programs and the development of additional reentry
programs).
11 First Step Act § 601 (“[T]he Bureau of Prisons [shall] place the prisoner as close
as practicable to the prisoner’s primary residence, and to the extent practicable, in a
facility within 500 driving miles of that residence.”).
12 Brandon L. Garrett, Federal Criminal Risk Assessment, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 133
(2019) (“A wide range of civil rights groups such as the National Urban League, the
American Civil Liberties Union, #cut50, as well as conservative groups . . . praised the
legislation.”).
13 Rachel Anspach, How the First Step Act Got People Out of Prison and Back with
Their Families, MIC (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.mic.com/p/how-the-first-step-actgot-people-out-of-prison-back-with-their-families-19629720.
14 In this Article, I use the terms “inmate” and “prisoner” to refer to people who are
currently incarcerated. In past scholarship, I have used the term I prefer, “incarcerated
person.” See, e.g., Amy B. Cyphert, Prisoners of Fate: The Challenges of Creating Change
for Children of Incarcerated Parents, 77 MD. L. REV. 385 (2018). Here, I use the terms
“inmate” and “prisoner” for the sake of consistency and clarity because they are the
terms used throughout both the First Step Act and the subsequent DOJ reports
announcing and clarifying the PATTERN tool.
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result, the Department of Justice (DOJ) worked with outside consultants
to develop an algorithmic assessment tool, PATTERN, to classify each
federal inmate as being minimum, low, medium, or high risk of
reoffending. This Article examines PATTERN, contextualizing it
historically in the evolution of recidivism prediction tools as well as
assessing where it represents advances in the field and where it is
problematic.
Part II of this Article traces the history of recidivism prediction
practices, starting with early clinical models wherein judges and
probation officials used their experience to assess the likelihood an
individual would reoffend. The historical overview then moves into
today’s sophisticated algorithmic models, many of which are fueled by
machine learning. This new field of algorithms has been attacked as
opaque, shielded in secrecy, and racially biased. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s recent decision concerning the recidivism prediction
algorithm COMPAS—and the backlash it sparked—offers a lens into
how courts treat these tools.
Part III then discusses the First Step Act, and specifically, the
requirements therein that a risk and needs assessment tool be
developed. Congress was specific about certain features, requiring, for
example, that the tool be objective and statistically validated,15 publicly
released, and quickly developed.16 Congress was silent, however, about
other features such as where to set the risk-level cutoffs, how to define
recidivism, and how to assess accuracy. Congress’s silence on those
topics was a de facto delegation of several critical policy decisions to the
Attorney General, who in turn delegated those policy decisions to the
outside consultants hired to develop PATTERN.
Part IV is the heart of the Article, outlining and dissecting
PATTERN’s incomplete progress toward better recidivism prediction.
This Article attempts to give credit where credit is due, acknowledging
the places where DOJ has made attempts at important goals like
transparency, public input, and best practices in tool design. But
PATTERN still falls short in each of those areas and others, and DOJ
needs to do more as it continues to update and calibrate PATTERN. For
example, although DOJ has provided some important transparency with
respect to PATTERN, the dataset that was used to train the algorithm
must be publicly released to allow for independent verification of the
DOJ’s claims about the tool’s accuracy and lack of bias. Further, the
Department must continue to listen to the community and other

15
16

First Step Act § 101(a) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)).
Id.
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stakeholders and be responsive to the consistent and informed criticism
it has received about things like how to properly evaluate PATTERN’s
accuracy and how to address racial bias. This is especially important
given that PATTERN is being used to determine which inmates are
eligible for early release during the COVID-19 pandemic,17 which has
disproportionately impacted Black Americans.18 Further, the decision
to prioritize the risk assessment over the needs assessment reduces
PATTERN’s ability to reward inmates for participating in programming,
which is an evidence-based way to reduce recidivism.
There are things to laud in the First Step Act, and PATTERN’s risk
predictions may offer some inmates an opportunity for early release and
reunification with their families. To ensure this opportunity is fairly
apportioned, PATTERN must be rigorously evaluated, and DOJ needs to
do more to allow that to happen.
II. HISTORY OF RECIDIVISM PREDICTION
A. Evolution from Clinical Models to Actuarial Models
Although the use of algorithms fueled by machine learning may be
relatively new to the criminal justice world, predicting how likely a
criminal defendant or inmate is to reoffend is not a new phenomenon.
Judges, probation professionals, and correctional staff have long used a
variety of tools, including their own intuition, to assess the likelihood
that a person would reoffend. In the early part of the twentieth century,
under what has been termed the “clinical model” of risk assessment,19
correctional staff and clinical professionals, such as psychiatrists and
social workers, played a prominent role in determining “who required
17 In a March 26, 2020, letter to BOP officials, Attorney General Bill Barr directed the
BOP to prioritize the use of granting home confinement to certain inmates in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Attorney General Barr indicated that decisions about who was
eligible for home confinement should include an examination of factors such as inmate
age and vulnerability, as well as “[t]he inmate’s score under PATTERN, with inmates
who have anything above a minimum score not receiving priority treatment.”
Memorandum from Bill Barr, Attorney General, to Bureau of Prisons Officials (Mar. 26,
2020).
18 The CDC has acknowledged that early data regarding the COVID-19 pandemic
provides increasing evidence that “some racial and ethnic minority groups are being
disproportionately affected by COVID-19.” Health Equity Considerations and Racial and
Ethnic Minority Groups, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html (last updated
July 24, 2020).
19 Alyssa M. Carlson, The Need for Transparency in the Age of Predictive Sentencing
Algorithms, 103 IOWA L. REV. 303, 305 (2017) (“In the clinical model, assessments to
evaluate a defendant are either made by mental health experts or other actors in the
criminal justice system, such as judges or parole boards.”).
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enhanced security and supervision,”20 and thus who should have a
longer carceral sentence.
In the 1970s, “there was a growing recognition that the assessment
of risk needed to depend more upon actuarial, evidence-based science
and less on professional judgement.”21 Actuarial risk assessment
systems were developed to attempt to provide a more objective
approach to predicting recidivism.
These early actuarial risk
assessments examined which factors were most likely to be statistically
associated with reoffending—such as a history of substance abuse—and
assigned points to inmates who presented with those factors.22 The
higher the point total, the higher, in theory, the risk that a person would
reoffend (and therefore the longer the carceral sentence). One major
shortcoming was that these early models focused mostly on the types of
static, historical data that was easily available to corrections
professionals at the time, namely, criminal history information.23
Because these early models were based on historical data, there was no
opportunity for an individual to improve his or her score through
activities, such as education courses or substance abuse treatment.
Simply put, the early actuarial models did not “account for offenders
changing for the better.”24
In response, researchers began in the late 1970s and early 1980s
to develop new actuarial models that took into account dynamic
features such as employment while incarcerated and family
relationships.25 These newer tools were called “risk-need assessments”
because they looked not only at the risk that a person would reoffend
but also at the needs they might have to reduce their likelihood of

20 James Bonta & D.A. Andrews, Risk-Need-Responsivity Model for Offender
Assessment and Rehabilitation 2006–07, PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA 3 (2007),
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rsk-nd-rspnsvty/rsk-nd-rspnsvtyeng.pdf (noting that these professionals were “[g]uided by their own professional
training and experience,” and that the “assessment of risk was a matter of professional
judgement”).
21 Id.
22 Id. (“Actuarial risk assessment instruments consider individual items (e.g., history
of substance abuse) that have been demonstrated to increase the risk of reoffending and
assign these items quantitative scores.”).
23 Id. (“The items that create these instruments are chosen simply because they are
easily available and show an association with recidivism. The items are not chosen
because they are theoretically relevant. Thus, the majority of the items are criminal
history items—the type of information that correctional systems are quite efficient at
collecting and distributing.”).
24 Id. at 4.
25 Id.
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reoffending.26 Having information about inmates’ needs helped
corrections staff appropriately identify the kinds of interventions
inmates required to help reduce their recidivism risk.27 This risk and
needs model is still with us today (and indeed was required by the First
Step Act), but advances in technology have changed the tools’ level of
sophistication and complication.
B. Modern Risk Assessment Tools
1. Machine Learning Algorithms
Today’s modern risk assessment tools, including PATTERN,
continue to address both risk and needs. As of 2015, over sixty different
risk assessment tools were used in the sentencing context alone,28 and
more were used for bail determinations and by corrections officials. A
2010 Vera Institute for Justice survey found that “[a]lmost every state
uses an assessment tool at one or more points in the criminal justice
system,” and that “over 60 community supervision agencies in 41 states
reported using an actuarial assessment tool.”29
Many of today’s tools are algorithms that are fueled by machine
learning, which allows them to consider many more factors than ever
before and to also more closely examine the myriad ways in which those
factors might interact with each other.30 “Machine learning is an
umbrella term to describe a special subset of algorithms wherein a
computer is programmed to revise the code it is using as it works, based
26 Bonta & Andrews, supra note 20, at 4 (noting that these new risk-need models
“were sensitive to changes in an offender’s circumstances and also provided
correctional staff with information as to what needs should be targeted in their
interventions”).
27 Id.
28 Aziz Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1075
(2019); see also Carlson, supra note 19, at 309.
29 Memorandum from the Vera Inst. of Justice, Ctr. on Sentencing & Corr. to Illinois
Risk, Assets and Needs Assessment Task Force 6, 1 (May 27, 2010),
https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/Documents/National_Information_Offender_Assessme
nts_PartII_Memo.pdf; see also Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Risk Assessment
Tools, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crimjustice (last visited Aug. 23, 2020) (noting that algorithmic recidivism prediction tools
are used in nearly every state).
30 Danielle Kehl, Priscilla Guo, and Samuel Kessler, Algorithms in the Criminal Justice
System: Assessing the Use of Risk Assessments in Sentencing 9 (2017) (unpublished
student work available through Responsive Communities Initiative, Berkman Klein
Center for Internet & Society, Harvard Law School) (on file with Digital Access to
Scholarship at Harvard), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33746041 (“A
number of modern risk-assessment tools take advantage of machine learning
algorithms, which generate risk models based on vast quantities of data. As these
algorithms are used over time, their models often dynamically adjust to new data.”).
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on the results it is generating.”31 Put simply, the machine is
programmed to perform certain tasks, “learns” from the results it is
seeing, and updates its code accordingly. Because the computer is
revising the code, often in real time and perhaps thousands of times,
people refer to machine learning algorithms as “black boxes” because
the developers cannot easily explain why the algorithm produces the
outputs it does, even when they know the inputs.32
One of the most commonly used tools today is Correctional
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS).
COMPAS’s developers describe it as a “web-based tool designed to
assess offenders’ criminogenic needs and risk of recidivism.”33 COMPAS
makes its predictions based on data it compiles in a 137-question
evaluation, with questions ranging from “[d]o you feel that the things
you do are boring or dull?” to “[i]f people make me angry or lose my
temper, I can be dangerous.”34 The public widely criticized COMPAS,
which the software company Northpointe developed, after May 2016
reporting by ProPublica revealed that Black defendants were 77% more
likely to be labeled as a higher risk of committing a future violent crime
than white defendants.35
31

Amy B. Cyphert, Tinker-ing with Machine Learning: The Legality and Consequences
of Online Surveillance of Students, 20 NEV. L.J. 457, 461 (2020).
32 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on the Federal Bureau of Prisons and Implementation of
the First Step Act Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement
of David E. Patton, Exec. Director, Fed. Defenders of New York) (“[A]cross risk
assessments in criminal justice, the secrecy that permeates black box instruments
causes significant concerns about how reasonable they are in practice.”); Joshua A. Kroll
et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638 (2017) (“Machine learning, one
increasingly popular approach to automated decisionmaking, is particularly ill-suited to
source code analysis because it involves situations where the decisional rule itself
emerges automatically from the specific data under analysis, sometimes in ways that no
human can explain.”); Han-Wei Liu, Ching-Fu Lin & Yu-Jie Chen, Beyond State v. Loomis:
Artificial Intelligence, Government Algorithmization, and Accountability, 27 INT’L J.L. &
INFO. TECH. 122, 135 (2019) (noting that the black box problems cannot be resolved by
enacting transparency requirements because “[t]he technical nature of AI techniques is
characterized by an inherent lack of transparency,” with even the programmers unable
to explain why and how certain determinations are made). But see Cyphert, supra
note 31, at 479 (acknowledging that machine learning algorithms can be shrouded in
mystery but that there are none the less “several stages in the machine learning process
where humans are making decisions and where safeguards can help control against
bias.”).
33 Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges,
52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 239 (2015) (quoting NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO
COMPAS 1 (2013)).
34 Carlson, supra note 19, at 310–11.
35 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.pro
publica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. In
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2. State v. Loomis
In a high-profile and landmark opinion,36 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court examined the use of the COMPAS tool. Eric Loomis pleaded guilty
to attempting to flee a traffic officer and operating a motor vehicle
without the owner’s consent.37 The court ordered a presentence
investigation, and the “Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) included
an attached COMPAS risk assessment.”38 Mr. Loomis’s COMPAS risk
scores “indicated that he presented a high risk of recidivism” across all
three of the risk areas COMPAS purports to assess: pretrial recidivism
risk, general recidivism risk, and violent recidivism risk.39 The State
relied on the COMPAS scores during its arguments at sentencing,40 and
the sentencing judge relied on the COMPAS scores in ruling out
probation for Mr. Loomis.41 The court sentenced Mr. Loomis to six years
of confinement.42
After his initial sentencing hearing, Mr. “Loomis filed a motion for
post-conviction relief requesting a new sentencing hearing,” arguing
among other things that the sentencing court’s use of COMPAS in
crafting his sentence had violated his due process rights.43 At a
subsequent hearing, an expert witness testified that “consideration at
sentencing of the risk assessment portions of COMPAS runs a
‘tremendous risk of over estimating an individual’s risk and . . .
response, Northpointe sent ProPublica a letter, wherein it “criticized ProPublica’s
methodology and defended the accuracy of its test: ‘Northpointe does not agree that the
results of your analysis, or the claims being made based upon that analysis, are correct
or that they accurately reflect the outcomes from the application of the model.’” Id. For
more about the fallout from the ProPublica article, see Cyphert, supra note 31,
at 465–67.
36 See Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 20 (describing the Loomis opinion as “a landmark
decision,” and noting that “it was the first time a U.S. court evaluated these algorithms
head on”).
37 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290
(2017).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 754–55.
40 Id. at 755. Specifically, the prosecutor said at sentencing that “the COMPAS report
that was completed in this case does show the high risk and the high needs of the
defendant. There’s a high risk of violence, high risk of recidivism, high pre-trial risk; and
so all of these are factors in determining the appropriate sentence.” Id.
41 Id. at 755. The Judge first noted that Mr. Loomis had been identified, “through the
COMPAS assessment, as an individual who is at high risk to the community.” Id. He went
on to add that “I’m ruling out probation because of the seriousness of the crime and
because your history, your history on supervision, and the risk assessment tools that have
been utilized, suggest that you’re extremely high risk to re-offend.” Id. (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 756 n.18 (noting that Loomis had been sentenced to two years incarceration
on one count and four years incarceration on another, to be served consecutively).
43 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 756.
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mistakenly sentencing them or basing their sentence on factors that
may not apply.’”44 Mr. Loomis’s expert witness further pointed out that
the court was missing key information about COMPAS, including what
dataset was used to develop it.45 The judge denied the post-conviction
motion, explaining that he “would have imposed the same sentence
regardless of whether [he] considered the COMPAS risk scores.”46
On appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Mr. Loomis argued that
his due process rights had been violated because the algorithm used by
COMPAS was given trade secret protection and so “the proprietary
nature of COMPAS prevent[ed] him from assessing its accuracy.”47 In
rejecting that argument, the Wisconsin Supreme Court placed great
weight on the fact that COMPAS used only publicly available information
in formulating a risk score, and therefore Mr. Loomis had an opportunity
to verify the information.48 The fact that Mr. Loomis had no idea how
much weight, if any, the COMPAS tool provided to any of those
individual factors was not enough, under the court’s ruling, to create a
due process violation, but many scholars have disagreed with this
conclusion.49 “Simply put, Loomis may have seen the input and output
[of COMPAS], but had no idea of [those inputs’] relationship,”50
information that would have been crucial for him to vigorously
challenge his risk classification.51 The United States Supreme Court
declined to hear Mr. Loomis’s appeal of the Wisconsin court’s decision,52
so the decision and its problematic holdings remain law in the state of

44

Id.
Id. at 756–57. The expert testified that “[t]he Court does not know how the
COMPAS compares that individual’s history with the population that it’s comparing
them with. The Court doesn’t even know whether that population is a Wisconsin
population, a New York population, a California population . . . . There’s all kinds of
information that the court doesn’t have, and what we’re doing is we’re mis-informing
the court when we put these graphs in front of them and let them use it for sentence.”
46 Id. at 757.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 761. The Court held that “to the extent that Loomis’s risk assessment [was]
based upon his answers to questions and publicly available data about his criminal
history, Loomis had the opportunity to verify that the questions and answers listed on
the COMPAS report were accurate.” Id.
49 See, e.g., Han-Wei Liu et al., supra note 32, at 132 (“While COMPAS algorithms
drew on public data and information provided by Loomis, it did not explain the
breakdown of each variable, relevant weighting and their correlation.”).
50 Id. at 133.
51 See Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 28 (noting that many scholars have expressed
“broad concerns” about how inputs “are weighted by the algorithm, and . . . whether
specific factors (or combinations of factors) may end up serving as proxies for
problematic or impermissible variables like race and poverty”).
52 Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
45
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Wisconsin and remain influential as the most well-known example of a
court examining recidivism prediction algorithms.
It is worth noting that the Wisconsin Supreme Court did provide
parameters and cautions in the Loomis decision that are especially
noteworthy given PATTERN’s role in determining who is eligible for
early release. The Loomis court held that that COMPAS scores could not
be used: “(1) to determine whether an offender is incarcerated; [ ] (2) to
determine the severity of the sentence,” or (3) “as the determinative
factor in deciding whether an offender can be supervised safely and
effectively in the community.”53 In contrast, PATTERN is the only tool
that will determine the risk category where an inmate is placed. As is
discussed in Part IV, it is unclear whether there will be any meaningful
opportunity for an inmate to challenge his or her PATTERN score.
Further, unlike COMPAS, PATTERN is not just one factor that is weighed
in deciding who is eligible for benefits like early release, it is THE factor.
Thus, PATTERN is in certain, important ways more influential than
COMPAS in determining how long an inmate is incarcerated.
III. PATTERN: THE RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT TOOL
A. The First Step Act’s Charge to the Attorney General
In Title I of the First Step Act, Congress delegated to the Attorney
General54 the task of developing and implementing a risk and needs
assessment system.55 The Act’s language encouraged the Attorney
General to consider algorithmic decision-making, defining the risk and
needs system as “an objective and statistically validated method” which
determines the risk of recidivism.56 The Act does not require the
reinvention of the wheel; in developing the risk and needs assessment
system, it allows the Attorney General to use existing risk and needs
53

State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 769 (Wis. 2016).
The Act provides that the Attorney General work in consultation with several
others, namely the Director of the Bureau of Prisons; the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts; the Director of the Office of Probation and Pretrial
Services; the Director of the National Institute of Justice; the Director of the National
Institute of Corrections; and an Independent Review Committee authorized by the Act.
First Step Act § 101(a) (2018).
55 The Department of Justice has defined risks versus needs as follows: “Whereas
risk refers to an inmate’s statistical propensity for recidivism or some other adverse
outcome, needs represents the areas of intervention that must be addressed to mitigate
the risk of recidivism.” U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., THE FIRST STEP ACT OF
2018: RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 28 (2019) [hereinafter FIRST STEP ACT REPORT]
https://nij.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh171/files/media/document/the-first-step-actof-2018-risk-and-needs-assessment-system_1.pdf.
56 First Step Act § 101(a) (emphasis added).
54
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assessment tools.57 As its name suggests, the risk and needs assessment
tool has twin aims: each inmate is assigned a risk of recidivism category
and also assessed for any needs they may have to minimize their risk of
recidivism.
With respect to risk, the Act charged the Attorney General with
developing a tool to “determine the recidivism risk of each prisoner as
part of the intake process, and classify each prisoner as having
minimum, low, medium, or high risk for recidivism.”58 It did not provide
any guidance on where to set those cutoffs. The stakes of the
assessment are high, as inmates assigned a recidivism risk of
“minimum” or “low” are eligible to earn additional time credits toward
early release59 as well as home confinement.60 Further, the Act directed
that “prisoners with a similar risk level be grouped together in housing
and assignment decisions to the extent practicable.”61 There were also
additional incentives for participation in the recidivism reduction
programming, including increased phone and visitation privileges,62
“increased commissary spending limits and product offerings,”63 and
additional “opportunities to access the email system.”64 The Act
required that the assessment be dynamic, capable of changing over time
as inmates either progress or regress.65
57

Id.
Id. The “recidivism” the system assessed was specifically “the risk of violent or
serious misconduct of each prisoner[.]” Id. § 3632(a)(2).
59 Id. All eligible inmates are able to earn 10 days of time credits for every 30 days
they participate in the recidivism reduction programs; those who are classified as
“minimum” or “low” risk for recidivating, earn an additional 5 days of time credits. Id.
60 Id. § 602. Section 602 of the First Step Act amends 18 U.S.C. 3624(c)(2) by adding:
“The Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, place prisoners with lower risk
levels and lower needs on home confinement for the maximum amount of time
permitted under this paragraph.” Id.
61 Id. § 101(a).
62 First Step Act § 101(a).
A prisoner who is successfully participating in an evidence-based
recidivism reduction program shall receive [ ] phone privileges, or, if
available, video conferencing privileges, for up to 30 minutes per day,
and up to 510 minutes per month; and [ ] additional time for
visitation at the prison, as determined by the warden of the prison.
Id. Contact with family while a person is incarcerated has been shown to be one factor
in reducing recidivism, especially for incarcerated parents. See Amy B. Cyphert,
Prisoners of Fate: The Challenges of Creating Change for Children of Incarcerated Parents,
77 MD. L. REV. 385, 394–96 (2018)
63 First Step Act § 101(a).
64 Id.
65 First Step Act § 101(a) required that the BOP’s tool “reassess the recidivism risk
of each prisoner periodically, based on factors including indicators of progress, and of
regression, that are dynamic and that can reasonably be expected to change while in
prison[.]” Id.
58
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Congress did not stop at charging the Attorney General with
developing a tool to determine and categorize risk. The Act also
required a needs assessment for each inmate, which would result in a
tailored determination of the recidivism reduction programming
and/or productive activities that would best help to reduce that
person’s likelihood of reoffending upon release from prison.66 The Act
defined “evidence-based recidivism reduction program” as “a group or
individual activity that [ ] has been shown by empirical evidence to
reduce recidivism or is based on research indicating that it is likely to
be effective in reducing recidivism[.]”67 These programs may include a
wide variety of topics and approaches, ranging from “social learning and
communication, interpersonal, anti-bullying, rejection response, and
other life skills”68 to vocational training.69 The Act defined “productive
activities” somewhat circularly as activities that allow inmates to
remain productive and maintain a low risk of recidivating.70 The Act
required that those labeled with a higher risk of reoffending be given
priority access to recidivism reduction programs, and that those
classified as lower risk for reoffending be given priority access to
productive activities.71 The Attorney General was also directed to
review existing evidence-based recidivism programs and productive
activities, identifying which were most effective and coordinating with
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) about them.72
66 Id. (requiring that the Attorney General “determine the type and amount of
evidence-based recidivism reduction programming that is appropriate for each prisoner
and assign each prisoner to such programming accordingly, and based on the prisoner’s
specific criminogenic needs”). With respect to “criminogenic needs,” the First Step Act
Report announcing the creation of the PATTERN tool notes: “Although research varies
about how each of these needs is linked to recidivism risk, criminal thinking, antisocial
peers, substance abuse, and education and vocational needs typically are identified as
important criminogenic needs.” FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 29.
67 First Step Act § 101(a).
68 Id.
69 Id. Other topics include academic classes, mentoring, and substance abuse
treatment. Id.
70 Id. The Act defines a “productive activity” as:
[E]ither a group or individual activity that is designed to allow
prisoners determined as having a minimum or low risk of
recidivating to remain productive and thereby maintain a minimum
or low risk of recidivating, and may include the delivery of the
programs described in paragraph (1) to other prisoners.
Id.
71 The Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3621(h)(6) as follows: “Priority for participation in
recidivism reduction programs shall be given to medium-risk and high-risk prisoners,
with access to productive activities given to minimum-risk and low-risk prisoners.”
First Step Act § 102.
72 First Step Act § 101(a).
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B. The Development of PATTERN
The Act had an ambitious timeline, providing only 210 days from
the date of its passage until the risk and needs assessment system
needed to be developed and publicly released.73 Further, certain tasks
had to be completed prior to the release of the system, including the
Attorney General’s review of existing recidivism programs and
corresponding direction to BOP about them.74 On July 19, 2019, exactly
209 days after the passage of the First Step Act, Attorney General
William Barr publicly released the Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting
Estimated Risks and Needs, or “PATTERN.” Two outside experts, Dr.
Grant Duwe and Dr. Zachary Hamilton, designed PATTERN,75 both
having previously developed risk and needs assessment programs.76
Dr. Duwe and Dr. Hamilton participated in three listening sessions
the DOJ hosted during PATTERN’s development “to enable experts,
stakeholders—including organizations representing crime victims—
and public interest organizations to comment” on its development.77
They also participated in conference calls with the constituent groups
with whom the Act required the Attorney General to collaborate: the
BOP, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and the Independent Review
Committee.78 Further, after the original public release of the tool in June
of 2019, the DOJ continued to host listening sessions and gather
feedback in a 45-day public comment period.79 On January 15, 2020, the
DOJ released a report announcing certain updates to the PATTERN tool,

73

Id.
Id.
75 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 12.
76 Id. at 13. Dr. Duwe has developed four separate risk assessment instruments,
including the Minnesota Screening Tool Assessing Recidivism Risk. Id. Dr. Hamilton has
developed several risk-need assessment systems for adults and juveniles in the states of
Delaware, Iowa, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Washington. Id.
77 Id. at 14.
78 Id. at 42. The Act tasked the NIJ with choosing a nonpartisan, nonprofit
organization with expertise in risk and needs assessment tools to host the IRC and select
its members. First Step Act § 107. The NIJ selected the Hudson Institute as the host of
the IRC. FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 9. The Hudson Institute then selected
the IRC’s six members: Dr. Patti Butterfield, Dr. James M. Byrne, Dr. Faye S. Taxman,
George J. Terwilliger III, John P. Walters, and John E. Wetzel. Id. at 10–12; see also
Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of John P. Walters, Member, First Step Act
Independent Review Committee) (“The Independent Review Committee is composed of
six experts from a range of fields and with extensive expertise in both research and
operations.”). For more on the qualifications of the IRC members, see First Step Act
sections 107(c) and 107(d); see also infra note 225.
79 See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018:
RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT SYSTEM—UPDATE 3 (January 2020) [hereinafter UPDATED
REPORT].
74
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updates that the Department said were made “as a direct result of the
input and suggestions” received during the public comment period.80
Still, DOJ announced more changes to the tool in June of 202081 after
ProPublica exposed secret changes made in the wake of the COVID-19
pandemic.82 These later changes to the tool are discussed at length
below.
In developing PATTERN, Dr. Duwe and Dr. Hamilton reviewed BOP
data concerning 278,940 former inmates who had been released into
the community.83 The BOP dataset tracked those who were rearrested
within three years and excluded those who died during the three-year
follow-up period as well as anyone scheduled for deportation.84 The
dataset also included information on factors the DOJ described as
“commonly associated with recidivism risk,”85 such as age at time of
release, criminal history, and any misconduct during the time of
incarceration.86
Dr. Duwe and Dr. Hamilton also reviewed data from BOP’s existing
recidivism prediction tools, BRAVO and BRAVO-R.87 BRAVO (“Bureau
Risk Assessment Verification and Observation”), created by the BOP in
the 1970s, “was designed to predict serious misconduct in prison.”88
BRAVO-R (“Bureau Risk Assessment Verification and ObservationRevised”) was “designed to address recidivism in the community,” and
“to predict misconduct for custody-level classification purposes.”89 Dr.
80

Id. at 1.
See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, FIRST STEP ACT IMPLEMENTATION FISCAL YEAR 2020 90-DAY
REPORT 1 (June 2, 2020) [hereinafter JUNE REPORT].
82 Ian MacDougall, Bill Barr Promised to Release Prisoners Threatened by
Coronavirus—Even as the Feds Secretly Made It Harder for Them to Get Out, PROPUBLICA
(May 26, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/bill-barr-promised-torelease-prisoners-threatened-by-coronavirus-even-as-the-feds-secretly-made-itharder-for-them-to-get-out.
83 The dataset included persons who had been released from BOP facilities from
2009 to 2015. FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 42. “The vast majority of items
within the dataset were drawn from SENTRY, the BOP’s centralized inmate management
system.” Id. at 49.
84 Id. at 42–43.
85 Id. at 43.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 12.
88 Id. at 12, 43.
89 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 12, 42. Some advocates have questioned
whether PATTERN is different enough from BRAVO or BRAVO-R to add meaningfully to
current BOP recidivism prediction efforts. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, STAKEHOLDER STATEMENTS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO NIJ’S
FIRST STEP ACT LISTENING SESSIONS (September 2019) [hereinafter NIJ LISTENING SESSION
STATEMENTS] (written statement of James F. Austin on behalf of the JFA Institute) (noting
that since “either the existing BOP BRAVO-R or the proposed PATTERN would be equally
81
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Duwe and Dr. Hamilton used the BOP dataset to develop and “validate”
PATTERN;90 they used the dataset both to build the tool initially and
then to test the tool and see what its predictive accuracy would have
been with respect to the known data on the three-year rearrest data.91
Part IV below addresses several outstanding questions regarding the
specifics of how Dr. Duwe and Dr. Hamilton developed and validated
PATTERN, including whether they used machine learning in developing
their algorithm.
C. Defining Recidivism: What Does PATTERN Purport to Predict?
PATTERN purports to predict the likelihood that a person will
reoffend within the three years following their release from a BOP
facility.92 Of course, as with any recidivism prediction tool, what
PATTERN is actually attempting to predict is not the likelihood that an
inmate will reoffend but the likelihood that they will be arrested and/or
convicted for criminal behavior.93 PATTERN was developed to predict
both “general recidivism” (defined as “any arrest or return to BOP
custody following release” within a three-year period post-release) as
well as “violent recidivism” (defined as “violent arrests following
release” within a three-year period post-release).94 These definitions of
recidivism have been criticized as overly broad for including minor
technical violations, like failing to update a residence,95 though the DOJ
effective [based on their AUC scores, this] raises the question of why the expense and
time [was] spent to develop an [sic] ‘new’ instrument that is already in place”).
90 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 43.
91 Specifically, they used approximately 2/3 of the dataset as “training data” to train
their algorithm with. Id. at 49. They then used the remaining approximately 1/3 of the
dataset as “test data” to establish the accuracy of the tool. Id.
92 Id. at 43.
93 Id. at 50. The decisions made by recidivism prediction tool developers about
“what counts” as recidivism at times “touches on key sentencing policy decisions often
left undecided by state actors.” Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY
L.J. 59, 78 (2017) (noting that when recidivism is defined solely by arrest, the data will
not reflect whether a person was ultimately exonerated because of an overturned
conviction or even if the prosecutor declines to press charges). See infra Part IV for a
discussion of how racial disparities in policing can further bias recidivism prediction
when recidivism is defined solely by arrest.
94 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 50.
95 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32, at 9 (“The definition the DOJ chose is unduly
broad, sweeping in revocations for minor technical violations such as failure to timely
report a change of residence, or failing to timely notify the probation officer of being
questioned by police.”); see also Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (Letter from Ames C.
Grawert to David B. Muhlhausen, NIJ Director (Sept. 3, 2019), attached to statement of
Ames C. Grawert, Senior Counsel, Justice Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU
School of Law) [hereinafter Brennan Center letter] (“PATTERN’s general tool was
designed around a very broad definition [of recidivism]: the risk that an incarcerated

CYPHERT (DO NOT DELETE)

348

11/5/2020 2:42 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:331

declined to narrow them in the revised PATTERN tool, claiming they
lacked the data necessary to do so.96 The terms have also been criticized
as too vague for not including a definition of which infractions are
deemed “violent.”97 In the Updated Report, the DOJ clarified that the
terms “general recidivism” and “violent recidivism” mirror the
definitions used by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and provided more
precise definitions and illustrative examples.98
In addition to dividing recidivism into “general” and “violent”
categories, PATTERN also subdivides depending on the gender of the
person being examined. The tool’s developers argue that “adding both
gender and outcome (i.e., general and violent recidivism) specificity”
represents “recent advancements in risk assessment tool construction”
over earlier tools such as BRAVO-R.99 To capture gender-specific risk
metrics, men and women were separated into individual samples and a
different algorithm was created for each.100
person would face a ‘new arrest or return to BOP custody within three years of
release.’”).
96 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 13. The DOJ also argued in the Updated Report
that it saw benefits in retaining the old definitions, including to allow BOP to “more
accurately measure how well a program is working” and to facilitate “comparisons
across risk assessment and criminal justice systems.” Id. at 14.
97 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32, Ex. A at 10 (“More information is needed here,
as well, regarding what kinds of arrests are considered ‘violent.’”).
98 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 12. Specifically, DOJ provided that:
General recidivism is defined as a return to BOP custody or a rearrest within three years of release from BOP custody, excluding all
traffic offenses except driving under the influence (DUI) and driving
while intoxicated (DWI). Violent recidivism is defined as a re-arrest
for a suspected act of violence within three years of release from BOP
custody. Examples of the violent offenses captured in this definition
include, but are not limited to, firearms violations, homicide, child
abuse, robbery, sex trafficking, and sexual assault.
Id. at 12–13.
99 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 44. This decision to separate men from
women when making recidivism predictions may well improve the accuracy of the tool
for both groups, given the disparate rates of violence. “When base rates of the predicted
outcome differ across groups, the most accurate algorithm possible will predict that
outcome at different rates across groups.” Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE
L.J. 2218, 2249 (2019). Gender-neutral risk assessment tools tend to have an adverse
effect on women by overestimating their risk of recidivism. See Sharad Goel et al., The
Accuracy, Equity, and Jurisprudence of Criminal Risk Assessment 9 (Dec. 26, 2018)
(unpublished article), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3306723. PATTERN has been
criticized, however, for using different algorithms to assess men and women. See
UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 16 (noting that the DOJ had received feedback that
“PATTERN’s separate modelling for men and women raises constitutional concerns”).
100 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 49 (“Gender-responsive risk metrics
are developed by separating males and females into individual samples to produce
gender-specific prediction models, which improves both the context and accuracy of
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D. Risk Factors and Risk Levels
In making its predictions, the PATTERN tool takes into account
factors that are dynamic (things an inmate can change, like participation
in education classes while incarcerated) as well as static (historical
things that are unchangeable, such as the inmate’s age at arrest).101 The
use of both dynamic and static factors is considered a best practice,102
and indeed Congress mandated the use of both in the First Step Act.103
Examples of dynamic factors that PATTERN relies on in making its
predictions include an inmate’s participation in drug education and
treatment programs, participation in employment, and use of the
income earned from that employment for payment toward victim
restitution and/or dependents.104 Examples of static factors included in
the original PATTERN tool are age at first conviction, whether the crime
was “violent,” and whether the inmate was identified as a “sex
offender.”105
PATTERN’s inclusion of dynamic factors is noteworthy. As the
DOJ’s own report remarked, some research suggests that a predictive
tool’s potential for racial bias is lowered when dynamic factors are
included.106 Prior risk prediction tools utilized the “Burgess method,”
wherein each predictive factor was equally weighted,107 but the
PATTERN tool analytically weights the dynamic and static factors it
uses.108 It appears that the DOJ has publicly released the weights that
prediction.”). Males represented approximately 85% of the training and data samples,
and females the remaining 15%. Id.
101 Id. at 43.
Static factors are characteristics of inmates that are historical and
therefore unchangeable, such as offense severity, age at first arrest,
and criminal history at prison entry. By contrast, dynamic factors are
variables that may change over time and may reflect more recent
inmate behavior, such as prison misconduct or substance abuse.
Id. at 26.
102 Id.
103 See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 101, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018)
(requiring that the BOP’s tool “reassess the recidivism risk of each prisoner periodically,
based on factors including indicators of progress, and of regression, that are dynamic
and that can reasonably be expected to change while in prison”).
104 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 45.
105 Id. at 45–46.
106 Id. at 60.
107 The “Burgess method,” developed by Professor Ernest Burgess in 1927, used 21
factors to determine an individual’s likelihood of recidivism while on parole. The
“Burgess method” was one of the first risk assessment methods to be developed.
Carlson, supra note 19, at 308.
108 “Based on findings of previous studies, analytically weighting assessment items
improves predictive accuracy, and this was the method adopted for PATTERN.” FIRST
STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 50.
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PATTERN assigns to each of the predictive factors. The First Step Act
Report included a Table entitled “Points Assigned in the PATTERN Risk
Assessment Models,”109 and noted that “[l]arger values indicate greater
prediction strength for a given model.”110 Several advocates expressed
confusion about whether the points in that Table represented the final
and sole weighing of the factors.111 (Understanding the weights
assigned to the various predictive factors used in any prediction tool is,
of course, important to analyzing it.)112 In response, the Updated Report
clarified that “[e]ach individual’s response scores are summed to
compute a total score.”113
The PATTERN developers also had to decide where to place the
“cut-off points” that would define, as the Act required, the risk-level
categories of “high,” “medium,” “low,” or “minimum.”114 The DOJ has
acknowledged that there are “several known methods” for determining
such cutoff points, most using statistics.115 Even though sophisticated
statistics may be used to help determine cutoffs in a predictive
algorithm like PATTERN, the fact remains that the decisions about
where to place the cutoffs are best described as “a matter of policy, not
math,”116 and some scholars have argued that such important policy

109

Id. at 53–56.
Id. at 53. The Report also explained that “boosted regression models were
computed for each of the four models, with selected items and weights created from
model coefficients. Coefficient values for each model were converted (multiplied by
100) to whole numbers to improve ease of risk scoring.” Id. at 66.
111 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 32, Ex. A at 9 (letter from David E. Patton,
Exec. Director, Fed. Defenders of New York to David Muhlhausen, Director of Nat’l Inst.
of Justice, attached to statement of David E. Patton, Executive Director, Federal
Defenders of New York) (“The DOJ Report indicates that PATTERN involves ‘analytically
weighting assessment items,’ but more information is needed on whether the weights
are assigned solely through the points identified for each of the factors included in Table
2, or are somehow reweighted in an algorithm not discussed in the report.”).
112 Eaglin, supra note 93, at 73. Tool creators generally use one of two statistical
methods to weigh assessment factors. One statistical method assigns every factor equal
weight. The other statistical method assigns different weight to assessment factors
depending on how predictive each factor may be. Id. at 81.
113 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 37.
114 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 101, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
115 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 50.
116 Chelsea Barabas et al., An Open Letter to the Members of the Massachusetts
Legislature Regarding the Adoption of Actuarial Risk Assessment Tools in the Criminal
Justice System, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y 1, 4 (Nov. 9, 2017),
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34372582 (“By way of example, the
classification of a risk category applicable to a particular criminal defendant with
respect to a given risk score (e.g., high risk, medium risk, or low risk) is a matter of policy,
not math.”).
110
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decisions should not be left to predictive tool developers.117 PATTERN’s
developers set the cutoffs for its risk-level categories by basing them, in
part, on BOP base rates for general and violent recidivism,118 a decision
that has been criticized as “arbitrary.”119
In May of 2020, ProPublica published an article reporting that the
DOJ had quietly lowered the PATTERN risk-level cutoffs without making
any public acknowledgment of doing so, making it harder for inmates to
be classified as “minimum” risk, and had used the new risk-level cutoffs
in determining which inmates were eligible for early release during the
COVID-19 pandemic.120 A week later, the DOJ released a fiscal report
where it acknowledged the new, lower risk-level cutoffs.121 Ultimately,
to be classified as “low” or “minimum” risk and therefore be eligible for
early release and other benefits, an inmate must be classified as “low”
or “minimum” risk in both the general and violent recidivism prediction
models.122
117

See, e.g., Eaglin, supra note 93, at 59 (“Government agencies should always decide
the cut-off points.”). Indeed, the First Step Act Report acknowledged that the choice of
cutoff points is in some ways a policy decision.
The current cut points endeavor to set the appropriate balance
between maximizing the number of inmates eligible to earn early
release time credits and to participate in evidence-based
programming that would reduce their recidivism risk to a low or
minimum category, while also considering public safety and the risk
of recidivism upon release.
FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 51.
118 Id.
Specifically, the low risk threshold was set at roughly half the base
rate (or 24 percent) for general recidivism and just over two-thirds
the base rate for violent recidivism (or 12 percent). The minimum
risk category was set at just under one-quarter of the base rate (or
10 percent) for general recidivism and one-third of the base rate for
violent recidivism (or 5 percent). The high risk category was set at
roughly two-thirds above the base rate (or 80 percent) for general
recidivism, and just over twice the base rate (or 33 percent) for
violent recidivism.
Id. Anyone not identified as minimum, low, or high risk was, by default, classified as
medium risk. Id. “This specific set of cut-off points was one of nearly a dozen” cutoff
points that were tested by the PATTERN developers. Id.
119 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32, Ex. A at 16 (letter attached to statement of David
E. Patton, Exec. Director, Fed. Defenders of New York) (“For example, the decisions on
the cut-points, which necessarily impact fairness measures such as false positive rates
and positive predictive values, appear to have been made by the researchers and based
on arbitrary fractions or multiples of the recidivism rates.”).
120 MacDougall, supra note 82.
121 JUNE REPORT, supra note 81, at 2.
122 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 51.
The four categories were created for both general and violent
recidivism risk scores. A final set of categories was created where an
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PATTERN’s developers “analyzed” the impact of the initial risklevel cutoff points based on an inmate’s race and/or ethnicity by
creating a relative risk index. This index compares the proportion of
individuals from racial or ethnic groups across the sample to the
proportion of individuals from those same groups within the risk
levels.123 The First Step Act Report provides the results of the relative
risk index at Tables 8, 9, and 10, but does not discuss them.124 Scholars
who have examined those tables report that they “reflect[] racial
disparity.”125 No information was provided in the June Report
concerning the new, lower risk-level cutoff points or any racial
disparities.
E. Assessing PATTERN’s Accuracy
Having developed their tool using the BOP data, PATTERN’s
developers tested it to determine its predictive validity. They chose to
use a statistical method known as “area under curve” or “AUC.”126 At the
risk of oversimplifying what is an “an inherently difficult concept,” 127
AUC is essentially a measure of how well a predictive tool performs
when it makes the classifications it has been programmed to make. For
a recidivism prediction tool like PATTERN, AUC is best thought of as a
measure of how often the tool correctly assigned a higher risk level to
someone who reoffended than it did to someone who did not

individual must be identified as minimum risk of both general and
violent recidivism to be classified as minimum in the final RLCs. An
individual that was identified as lower than medium risk in both the
general and violent models was labeled as low risk in the final RLC.
Those individuals identified as high risk in either the general or
violent models were classified as high risk in the final RLCs. Finally,
those not classified as minimum, low, or high risk were identified as
medium risk in the final RLCs.
Id.
123 Id. at 53. The results of this relative risk index are displayed in Tables 8–10 of the
FIRST STEP ACT REPORT. Id. at 62.
124 Id. at 62.
125 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32, at 12 (statement of Prof. Melissa Hamilton).
Professor Hamilton notes that “[a]n RRI over 1.0 indicates disparity between groups,”
and that Table 8 of the First Step Act Report shows an RRI of 1.54 for males. Id. Put
another way, “[n]on-Whites are one-and-a-half times more likely to be assessed as
medium/high risk than Whites” under the original PATTERN tool. Id.
126 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 50 (“Relying on the AUC as the primary
metric for evaluating predictive validity, the research team analyzed how the PATTERN
instruments performed in predicting recidivism on the test set . . . .”).
127 Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual Recidivism in
Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 27 (2015).
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reoffend.128 In other words, if person A reoffended and person B did not,
and PATTERN classified person A as “high risk” and person B as
“medium risk,” that would be counted as “accuracy” for AUC purposes.
If the tool is correct in this classification half the time, the AUC score is
.5.129 If the tool is correct in this classification all of the time, the AUC
score is 1.130 Most of the recidivism prediction tools that are used today
have AUC values that fall between .60 to .80.131
PATTERN’s creators report that, based on its AUC value, PATTERN
is “15% more predictive than other [recidivism prediction] tools”!132 It
is worth noting here that although AUC is a widely used, popular method
to assess the predictive accuracy of risk assessment tools,133 the First
Step Act Report itself acknowledged that this method “can provide an
overly optimistic estimate of predictive discrimination for imbalanced
datasets.”134 According to the DOJ, PATTERN’s AUC values, which range
from .77 to .80,135 represent a “consistent, modest improvement” over
the predictive reliability of the BRAVO-R tool.136 PATTERN’s developers
also analyzed the tool and its risk-level cut points via odds ratios. The
developers calculated that, for general recidivism, inmates labeled as
minimum or low risk had an 86% reduced chance of recidivating as
compared to those labeled as medium or high risk.137 For violent
recidivism, those labeled as minimum or low risk had an 88% reduced
128 Id. at 25; see also Charlotte Hopkinson, Using Daubert to Evaluate Evidence-Based
Sentencing, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 741 (using AUC to measure “how well the predictive
test can differentiate those who experienced the outcome of interest (labeled as likely
to recidivate and did recidivate) versus those who did not (labeled as likely to recidivate
but did not recidivate)”).
129 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 56 (“[A]n AUC of .5 means there is a 50
percent probability that the result is accurate, which is the same as a coin toss.”).
130 Id. (“An AUC of 1.0 means there is a 100 percent probability in the result, which is
essentially perfection.”); see also Hamilton, supra note 127, at 25 (“AUC values lie
between 0 and 1, with .5 indicating discriminatory ability no better than chance and 1
indicating perfect discrimination.”).
131 Eaglin, supra note 93, at n.180.
132 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 57 fig.3.
133 Id. at 37; see also Eaglin, supra note 93, at 90 (“[A] popular method to assess
predictive accuracy measures the area under the curve, or the AUC value.”); Hamilton,
supra note 127, at 25 (noting that “[s]everal statistical measures of discrimination for
actuarial tools are available,” but that AUC “has come to dominate the relevant
literature”).
134 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 66 n.24. The Report goes on to note that
AUC “is relatively robust across different recidivism base rates and selection ratios.” Id.
135 Specifically, the AUC scores were calculated as follows: female violent recidivism
at .77; female general recidivism at .79; male violent recidivism at .78; and male general
recidivism at .8. Id. at 57 tbl.3.
136 Id. at 57.
137 Id. at 58.
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chance of recidivating, as compared to those labeled medium or high
risk.138 The First Step Act Report concluded that these findings “identify
a substantial demarcation in recidivism rates between early-releaseeligible (minimum and low) and non-eligible (medium and high) risk
categories.”139
DOJ also reported AUC scores for PATTERN that were broken down
by the race/ethnicity of the inmate. They used the four categories the
BOP data used: white, African American, Hispanic, and other.140 The
First Step Act Report is internally inconsistent on the presence of any
racial bias in PATTERN. At one point, the report concludes that the AUC
value findings “suggest” “minimal” racial or ethnic disparity with
respect to PATTERN’s predictive value,141 and just a few pages later the
report says that “the PATTERN instrument’s predictive performance is
unbiased across racial and ethnic classifications.”142 In any event, the
AUC calculations relied on to demonstrate racial neutrality actually
show that in both categories for male inmates (male general recidivism
and male violent recidivism), the AUC value calculated for white inmates
is higher than the AUC value for African American and Hispanic
inmates.143 This means that, accepting the DOJ’s own test for predictive
validity, PATTERN is less accurate in predicting recidivism for men of
color than for white men. The AUC values for white women were lower
than the AUC values for African American women but higher than those
of Hispanic women.144 The presence of racial bias in the PATTERN tool
and how to minimize it is addressed in Part IV.

138

Id.
Id.
140 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 60.
141 Id. (“Overall, these findings indicate strong and comparable prediction strength
for PATTERN models across all race/ethnicity categories, suggesting minimal
racial/ethnic disparity for PATTERN’s prediction strength.”).
142 Id. at 63.
143 See id. at 60 tbl.7. The AUC value for general recidivism among white men was
calculated to be .81, as opposed to .78 for both African American and Hispanic men. Id.
The AUC value for violent recidivism among white men was calculated to be .80, as
opposed to .75 for African American men and .78 for Hispanic men. Id.
144 Id. The AUC value for general recidivism among African American women was
calculated to be .80, as opposed to .79 for white women and .76 for Hispanic women. Id.
The AUC value for violent recidivism among African American women was calculated to
be .80, as opposed to .75 for both white and Hispanic women. Id. Professor Melissa
Hamilton notes that even though demographic parity is better for women than men
under PATTERN, it is still problematic and means that “African-American females
benefit less often from the First Step Act’s incentives and rewards.” Oversight Hearing,
supra note 32, at 13 (statement of Prof. Melissa Hamilton).
139
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IV. PATTERN’S INCOMPLETE PROGRESS
There are many unanswered questions about PATTERN and
several problems with its development and the assumptions that
underlie it. Still, it is important to note that there are some laudable
aspects to PATTERN, even as each is not yet sufficient. Specifically,
PATTERN’s development involves a level of transparency greater than
that of private software companies (although, as is discussed in the next
Section, still greater transparency is required); PATTERN’s commitment
to using dynamic factors, at least in theory, is a step in the right direction
(though its practical application is currently in doubt); the PATTERN
developers reached out to community stakeholders and held public
comment sessions in creating the tool; and PATTERN’s commitment to
recalibration and continued study is an important best practice.
Ultimately, the decision of the PATTERN developers to prioritize
accuracy over other important policy goals, and their decision to use
AUC as a proxy for accuracy, remain problematic.
A. Transparency
With respect to transparency, it should be acknowledged that the
DOJ has provided more information about PATTERN than many private
software companies provide about their recidivism prediction tools.
Northpointe’s decision to claim trade secret protection over its COMPAS
algorithm in the Loomis case is a troubling but not isolated example.
Indeed, one reason some academics have advocated for governmentdeveloped algorithms is precisely to avoid such trade secret and
proprietary claims, in the hope that government-funded software would
be available to the public at large to inspect.145 One academic noted that

145 See, e.g., Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 2025−26 (2017)
(citing CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY
AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 27 (2016)) (advocating that “courts and legislatures should
consider requiring that software used in criminal trials and sentencings be publicly
designed and open-source,” and noting that “[p]ublic models would have the benefit of
being ‘transparent’ and ‘continuously updated, with both the assumptions and the
conclusions clear for all to see’”); see also Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 28 (noting that
“[a]cademic researchers and governments, [as opposed to private software companies,]
. . . tend to have more incentives to make the details of their algorithms publicly available
and ensure that they are subject to appropriate scrutiny and oversight”). It is worth
noting that the DOJ and other government agencies have claimed trade secret protection
over government-developed software programs. See, e.g., Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty
and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1343, 1346 (2018) (“[T]he federal government claimed that trade secret interests
should shield details about how a cybercrime investigative software program operates
. . . .”). Further, “New York City’s Office of Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) argued,
repeatedly and successfully, that the source code for a forensic software program
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even providing the “minimal disclosures” of “information about the
specific origin of the data set underlying a tool” and “the selection of risk
factors”—both items the DOJ appears to have provided—would “go
beyond what many developers currently provide.”146
1. Congress Mandated Certain Disclosures in the Act
Congress mandated in the First Step Act that the Attorney General
not only create a risk and needs assessment but further that he publicly
release that system.147 Accordingly, the First Step Act Report provides
the following about PATTERN: (1) some information about what the
dataset used to develop the tool was;148 (2) what the numeric risk-level
cutoffs are149 (though, of course, as noted above, those cutoff levels
appear to have been changed without a timely public acknowledgment);
(3) the factors that the tool uses in calculating an inmate’s risk score;150
(4) the relative weight of each of those factors;151 and (5) some
information about the relative accuracy of the tool, at least as measured
by one technique as against other BOP recidivism prediction tools.152
The Updated Report also offers additional information about PATTERN,
namely which factors the PATTERN developers consider “dynamic” and
which they consider “static.”153
Congress also mandated in the First Step Act a certain level of
ongoing reporting about PATTERN. For example, the Act requires the
Director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics to annually submit to
Congress statistics on “[t]he breakdown of prisoners classified at each
risk level by demographic characteristics.”154 The Act also requires that
the Independent Review Committee submits to Congress a report
addressing the demographic percentages of inmates ineligible to
developed in-house using taxpayer funds should be protected from subpoena by
criminal defendants.” Id. at 1397.
146 Eaglin, supra note 93, at 111.
147 First Step Act § 3632(a) (“Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of the FIRST STEP Act, the Attorney General shall develop and release a risk and needs
assessment system[.]”)
148 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 43 (“Hamilton and Duwe used the BOP
datasets to develop and validate” PATTERN).
149 Id. at 58.
150 Id. at 53−56. The Updated Report also provides the factors for the updated tool.
UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 37−39.
151 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 53−56.
152 Id. at 57.
153 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 10−11.
154 See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 610(a)(26), 132 Stat. 5194
(2018) (requiring the annual breakdown of prisoners to include the following
demographic characteristics: “age, sex, race, and the length of the sentence imposed”).
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receive and apply time credits, including by age, race, and sex.155 These
reports, provided they are publicly released, should add to the overall
transparency of PATTERN by allowing researchers to examine them for
indicators of bias.
2. Additional Transparency Is Critical
Although these steps toward transparency are laudable, they are
wholly insufficient. There are several important steps that the DOJ
should take to provide more transparency about PATTERN—
transparency that will allow advocates to truly assess the fairness of the
system. “Greater transparency will have little impact if outside
researchers do not have access to the data and tools to evaluate and test
the algorithms for bias.”156
i. The Dataset Used to Create PATTERN Should Be Publicly
Released
First, the BOP dataset used to develop PATTERN should be publicly
released.
Several advocates and scholars—ranging across the
ideological spectrum from the Brennan Center to the Charles Koch
Institute—have already made this request in Congressional
testimony157 and at NIJ listening sessions,158 and the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) has submitted a FOIA
request for the dataset.159 The dataset is already complete, has already

155 See First Step Act § 107(g)(4) (requiring the Independent Review Committee to
submit “recommendations regarding recidivism reduction” with its report); see also id.
§ 103(8) (requiring the Comptroller General to conduct an audit of the use of the risk
and needs assessment system every two years, which must include an analysis of “[t]he
rates of recidivism among similarly classified prisoners to identify any unwarranted
disparities, including disparities among similarly classified prisoners of different
demographic groups, in such rates”).
156 Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 33.
157 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of David E. Patton, Executive
Director, Federal Defenders of New York) (“Full transparency requires the DOJ to
release the same dataset used by Grant Duwe, Ph.D., and Zachary Hamilton, Ph.D., to
create PATTERN.”); Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Prof. Melissa
Hamilton) (“The datasets should be public released.”).
158 See NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of Jeremiah
Mosteller on behalf of the Charles Koch Institute) (“[W]e strongly recommend that the
Department of Justice allow a group of independent, external researchers to analyze the
data used to develop the PATTERN and confirm its predictive validity before full
implementation by the Bureau of Prisons.”).
159 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (written Statement of Norman Reimer,
Executive Director of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). The FOIA
request, attached to the written statement, requested the dataset used to develop
PATTERN along with an array of other information, including the model used to train
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been provided to PATTERN’s developers, and should be relatively easy
to produce.160 Without access to the dataset, researchers and advocates
have to accept at face value the DOJ’s claims about PATTERN’s validity,
accuracy, and bias.161 Further, access to the dataset would allow
researchers to calculate other methods of accuracy beyond AUC, a
measure that is problematic for the reasons discussed below.162
Despite these compelling and uniform calls for release of the
dataset, the DOJ declined in the Updated Report to do so, arguing that
the data “is restricted because [it] . . . includes arrest and conviction
information provided directly to DOJ by state and local jurisdictions,
who have a significant interest in protecting their data.”163 Putting aside
the question of how much of the PATTERN data actually comes from
states and localities as opposed to how much is already in the
underlying BOP dataset, as the initial report provided, the argument
about data privacy does not withstand scrutiny. The DOJ is essentially
arguing that it cannot release data that is overwhelmingly publicly
available164 and was compiled with taxpayer dollars because of data
privacy concerns. Further, the DOJ claims that the information is subject
to “sharing agreements” that prohibit the release of the data.165 The DOJ
does not provide whether states insisted on these sharing agreements
or if the DOJ offered them as a matter of course. The Updated Report
even claims that anyone who accesses the data would have to have a
background check—without providing any source for that
PATTERN, clarification about certain risk factors, and information about how certain
risk factors were weighted. Id.
160 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Prof. Melissa Hamilton) (noting
that any datasets “have already been anonymized and delivered to the external
PATTERN developers. Hence, there is no obvious burden to personnel or resources for
the BOP and NIJ to publicly release these datasets.”).
161 See, e.g., id. (noting that with the public release of the PATTERN dataset,
researchers would “be able to calculate a host of measures that are absent in the DOJ
Report yet are relevant to a more holistic analysis of the validity, reliability, and equity
of the PATTERN tool as it exists”); Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of David
E. Patton, Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York) (“Access to the data would
allow independent researchers to isolate individual factors and determine which
contributed to any disparate impact.”).
162 See infra Section IV.D.; see also Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of
Prof. Melissa Hamilton) (“[T]he AUC has serious limitations and thus cannot present a
holistic portrait of a tool’s abilities.”).
163 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 14.
164 See Eldar Haber, Digital Expungement, 77 MD. L. REV. 337, 351 (2018) (noting that
criminal records “are generally considered public information” and that digital data
practices make them more publicly available than ever before).
165 See UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 14 (“The retrieval, disclosure, and
redistribution of that criminal history data is prohibited by the sharing agreements used
to acquire the underlying data.”).
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requirement—and that the expense and delay associated with
background checks make sharing the data widely “not a feasible
solution to increasing transparency with outside stakeholders.”166 The
DOJ does claim it will allow an unknown number of researchers an
opportunity to apply for the chance to conduct a five-year review of
PATTERN’s data—subject to “appropriate background investigations,
and permission from relevant justice agencies.”167 Ultimately, the DOJ is
offering its own version of Northpointe’s “trade secret” defense, and it
falls flat here as it should have in Loomis.168
ii. The DOJ Should Release Additional Information About the
Development of PATTERN
Even releasing the dataset, reticent as the DOJ is to do so, is not
enough to allow for a full and independent evaluation of PATTERN. The
DOJ needs to provide some additional information about how PATTERN
was developed. The NACDL FOIA request seeks additional information
beyond the dataset,169 and for good reason: this additional information
is critical to fully assessing PATTERN. “Full transparency” for
algorithmic assessment purposes requires the release of items such as
any source code.170 Further, we know that PATTERN’s developers
tested and rejected numerous risk-level cutoffs and static and dynamic
factors.171 Decisions about where to set risk-level cutoffs are “highly

166

Id. at 15.
Id.
168 The Wisconsin court’s decision to recognize any trade secret protection in Loomis
has been widely attacked. See, e.g., TAYLOR R. MOORE, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., TRADE
SECRETS & ALGORITHMS AS BARRIERS TO SOCIAL JUSTICE (2017) (arguing that trade secret law
is not properly calibrated to balance social good in situations like risk assessment and
“that a social justice framework should be incorporated into trade secret protection
when applied to risk-assessment algorithms”).
169 See supra note 159.
170 Kroll et al., supra note 32, at 641 (“[W]ithout full transparency—including source
code, input data, and the full operating environment of the software—even the
disclosure of audit logs showing what a program did while it was running provides no
guarantee that the disclosed information actually reflects a computer system’s
behavior.”).
171 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 51 (noting that PATTERN’s developers
tested nearly a dozen different cut points for the risk levels before selecting one); see
also UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 11 (“The Department analyzed more than a
hundred different iterations and variables in order to find those factors most predictive
of the risk of recidivism. The process of weighting the variables was based on scientific
research and analysis.”).
167
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subjective,”172 and are matters of policy, not math.173 The decisions
surrounding which factors to test and which to ultimately include in
PATTERN are important policy decisions that should be made
transparently,174 and researchers and advocates should be able to probe
the decisions. The DOJ needs to share information about the factor and
risk-level testing process and why it reached the decisions it made. This
is especially important given the troubling decision to lower the risklevel cutoffs in March 2020 with no public acknowledgment that the
cutoffs were lowered until June 2020 and after investigative reporting
by ProPublica. The June Report does not provide any explanation for
this decision beyond noting that “changes were made to raw scores to
ensure that inmates were accurately placed in the appropriate Risk
Level Category and the tool achieved the same high-level of predictive
accuracy” that it had previously purportedly attained.175
The DOJ also needs to disclose whether machine learning was used
to develop the risk classification algorithm. Although the question of
whether machine learning was used to develop PATTERN was raised in
Congressional testimony, there has so far been no answer from the DOJ,
including in the Updated Report it released in January of 2020.176 If
172 See Eaglin, supra note 93, at 87 (“Translating tool outcomes into risk categories is
a highly subjective, policy- oriented process.”). The risk-level cutoff point decisions for
PATTERN have been questioned. See NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89
(statement of Professor Christopher Slobogin) (“[W]hy are the high, medium, and low
risk cut-scores in the PATTERN set relative to the population sample rather than the
absolute probability of recidivism? The PATTERN’s method of setting cut scores means
that individuals with a 12% probability of committing a violent crime are considered
medium risk (see p. 51 of the report). A probability level that low is, at best, only
justifiable if ‘violent crime’ is defined narrowly.”).
173 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (letter attached to statement of David E.
Patton, Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York) (“Risk assessments are not
simply math. Every risk assessment involves moral choices and tradeoffs.”).
174 See Eaglin, supra note 93, at 79 (“Developers make judgment calls about what
factors to study in a data set.”); see also NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89
(written statement of Brandon L. Garrett and Megan T. Stevenson) (“The DOJ Report
that announced the development of the PATTERN describes how the experts who
developed it made certain key decisions concerning the risk thresholds that separate
these groups. However, no information is provided in that Report about how those
thresholds were set. Determining how many individuals are rated minimum or low risk,
and therefore get the many benefits associated with this designation, is one of the most
influential decisions pertaining to the risk assessment tool.”).
175 JUNE REPORT, supra note 81, at 2.
176 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (letter attached to statement of David E.
Patton, Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York) (“The DOJ Report provides
so few details on weighting, it is unclear what type(s) of models were used (such as
regressions) and/or whether any type of machine learning (supervised or
unsupervised) was employed. If the former, more information is needed regarding
whether and how stepwise procedures were used, data on intercorrelations, and if
multicollinearity exists. If the algorithm was developed with any form of machine
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machine learning was used to develop PATTERN (and many researchers
theorize that most new recidivism prediction tools will take advantage
of it),177 it could be quite difficult for even the tools’ developers to
explain why the factors were ultimately weighed in the way they
were.178 Ultimately, if PATTERN’s developers chose to use the more
opaque machine learning process over the more easily explainable
process of standard regression analysis in developing PATTERN,179 that
is a decision they should acknowledge, because “the choice to field such
a system instead of one which can be interpreted and governed is itself
a decision about the system’s design.”180 Further, they should be willing
to explain why any losses in explainability that occur as a result of using
machine learning are offset by gains in areas such as accuracy. In sum,
PATTERN’s developers need to say much more about how they
developed the tool and the policy decisions they codified in it.
B. Use of Dynamic Factors
As discussed above, it is a best practice for recidivism prediction
tools to use dynamic as well as static factors in classifying someone’s
risk of reoffending, and DOJ officials touted PATTERN’s use of dynamic
factors in testimony before Congress.181 PATTERN’s use of dynamic
factors is problematic, however, because it undervalues them in the
algorithm compared to static factors and because the BOP cannot
presently support all of the programs in which an inmate would need to
participate to meaningfully reduce his or her score.

learning, this more ‘black box’ method has different and profound implications on
transparency of the developmental procedures.”).
177 See, e.g., Huq, supra note 28, at 1067−68 (“Not all such tools use machine learning
or deep learning. But it is only a question of time before these powerful instruments
crowd out simpler models. . . . Even if machine-learning and deep-learning tools are not
now omnipresent, they will be soon.”).
178 Eaglin, supra note 93, at 119 (noting that the use of machine learning in risk tools
causes interpretability issues because “the developers creating the tools cannot explain
what factors a tool uses to predict recidivism risk”).
179 Because a computer may independently update the code algorithm in the machine
learning process, it is not enough to provide the original source code. “Online machine
learning systems update their decision rules after every query, meaning that any
disclosure will be obsolete as soon as it is made.” Kroll et al., supra note 32, at 660.
180 Id. at 637 n.9.
181 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate
Deputy Attorney General) (“Consistent with the Act, PATTERN incorporates dynamic
risk factors—things that an inmate can change over time. Such dynamic factors include,
among others, an inmate’s infractions, beneficial programs, and vocational courses.”).
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1. Inmates’ Theoretical Ability to Reduce Risk Score
In theory, the original PATTERN tool allowed an inmate to reduce
his or her recidivism risk rather dramatically through dynamic factors
such as job training and drug education. Theoretically, the original
PATTERN tool would have allowed a male inmate to reduce his general
recidivism score by as many as nineteen points182 (though there is some
dispute about which factors in that tool were truly dynamic and several
ways to approach this calculation).183 To contextualize what this
nineteen-point reduction could mean, imagine a male inmate to whom
PATTERN assigned an initial general recidivism risk score of fifty. This
initial score was due to static factors—factors that are historical and/or
outside of the inmate’s current control—namely, being age twentythree (+ thirty points); having been age twenty-two at the time of his
first conviction (+ eight points); and having a BRAVO criminal history
182 According to Table 2 of the First Step Act Report, a hypothetical male inmate could
receive the following reductions to his general recidivism score: twelve points for
completing eleven or more programs; four points for completing residential drug
treatment; two points for taking more than one technical or vocational courses; and one
point for receiving drug education while incarcerated. (Table 2 confusingly states that
an inmate would receive a two-point deduction if they take zero technical or vocational
courses but a zero-point deduction for taking two or more courses. This appears to be
an error and is treated as such here. See Brennan Center letter, supra note 95 (“We
believe that this [increase in risk-level point for completing vocational courses] may be
a typographical error”). The point allocation in the Updated Tool makes clear that
completing programs reduces an inmate’s score. See UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79,
at 38.) In the original PATTERN tool, female inmates received smaller deductions for
those categories but could have additional reductions for participating in employment
opportunities and complying with any financial responsibilities. FIRST STEP ACT REPORT,
supra note 55, at 53–55. Additionally, I do not classify the factor “no need for drug
treatment,” which deducts six points, as a “dynamic” factor because an inmate’s absence
of the need for drug treatment is presumably historical by the time they are assessed for
PATTERN purposes. But in an attempt to acknowledge all dynamic deductions available
under PATTERN, I have included the four-point deduction for an inmate who did need
drug treatment and who received residential treatment, a more traditionally dynamic
feature. Id.
183 I did not classify as dynamic the factors “infraction convictions,” “history of
violence,” “history of escape,” or “voluntary surrender,” because each is historical as of
the time of the initial assessment and can only be changed by an inmate if he or she
attempts an escape or has an infraction. The developers of PATTERN, however, have
classified “infraction convictions,” “history of violence,” and “history of escape” as
dynamic factors. See UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 7. Other advocates have pointed
out that PATTERN developers are “mistaken” in their classification of certain factors as
dynamic. See NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of Sarah
Anderson on behalf of FreedomWorks) (“[W]e believe that PATTERN mistakenly treats
some factors as ‘dynamic’ that, although they can reasonably be expected to change
while in prison, are not truly dynamic in nature.”). Of course, an inmate would also
reduce his or her PATTERN score on a subsequent rescoring simply by virtue of aging
and being placed in a different band for the “age at time of assessment” factor. Again,
this is not a truly “dynamic” factor, and so I do not include it here.
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score of six (+ twelve points).184 This hypothetical inmate’s score of fifty
would place him in the “high” risk level under PATTERN,185 and thus
preclude him from earning early release credits and other benefits, even
though he has never done things that increase a PATTERN score, such
as attempting escape or having “infraction violations” while
incarcerated. But if he was to earn the maximum deduction of nineteen
points through dynamic factors like participation in available
programming,186 his revised score would become thirty-one, thus
placing him in the “low” risk level under PATTERN’s original risk-level
cutoffs, and thereby allowing him to earn early release.187
The revised PATTERN tool was purportedly designed to include
additional dynamic factors that provide an inmate additional
opportunities to earn deductions to his or her score.188 The opportunity
to “earn” reductions is, at least for our hypothetical male inmate, not
substantially increased with the revised PATTERN tool, even as the
point “penalties” for factors like age at time of assessment and criminal
history score are increased relative to the original PATTERN tool.189
Imagine the same hypothetical male inmate. His new general recidivism
score under the revised PATTERN tool will have increased from fifty to
fifty-one,190 even though nothing about him has changed. Just as his
initial score has increased by one point, the theoretical reduction he can
earn through dynamic factors has likewise increased by one point. He
can now theoretically deduct six points for completing residential drug
treatment, eight points for completing at least eleven programs, two
184 All of these point totals are drawn from FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55,
at 53–55 tbl.2.
185 PATTERN places the “medium” risk-level cutoff for general recidivism at fortyfive; scores above that are labeled “high.” Id. at 58 tbl.4.
186 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 53–55 for a full breakdown of the math
and assumptions that go into the nineteen-point deduction calculation.
187 The PATTERN tool originally places the “low” risk-level cutoff for general
recidivism at thirty-three. FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 58 tbl.4.
188 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 8 (noting that the updated PATTERN tool
includes “an additional dynamic measure of offender’s ‘infraction free’ period during his
or her current term of incarceration”).
189 Under the original PATTERN tool, the points assigned for age at time of
assessment ranged from zero for male inmates over age sixty to thirty for inmates aged
eighteen to twenty-five. FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 54. In the revised
PATTERN tool, the points assigned for age at time of assessment ranged from zero for
inmates over age sixty to thirty-five for inmates under aged eighteen to twenty-five.
UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 37. Because the tool no longer assigns points for age
at first conviction, some recalibration of the other remaining static factors is to be
expected.
190 The static factors now give him an initial score as follows: being aged twentythree (+ thirty-five points); and having a BRAVO criminal history score of six (+ sixteen).
UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 37–38.
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points for participating in work programming, and four points if he
earns his high school degree or GED.191 Thus, his total possible
reduction is now twenty points, where it was previously nineteen
points. With his new base score of fifty-one and a reduction of twenty
points, he has a score of thirty-one, the same as he did under the original
PATTERN tool.192 This is because the new “dynamic factor” included in
the revised PATTERN tool—a measure of how long the inmate had been
“infraction free”—does not allow inmates to deduct points from their
score but instead builds additional points onto the base score. 193
Further, because of the change to the risk-level cutoff scores announced
in June of 2020, a score of thirty-one now places our hypothetical inmate
in the medium risk-level category,194 ineligible for early release, where
before a score of thirty-one placed him in the low risk-level category,
eligible for early release. So, for an inmate who had long been infraction
free, he or she may well be worse off under the revised PATTERN tool.
Indeed, the June Report acknowledges that under the revised tool, 4,430
inmates’ scores did increase, from low to medium.195
2. Inmates’ Actual Ability to Reduce Risk Score
The decision to reduce the total points inmates can deduct for
participation in certain programming in the revised PATTERN tool196 is
all the more troubling when you consider how unlikely it is that any
inmate can actually participate in all of that programming to begin with.
191 See id. at 38–39. As before, I have not classified the factor “no need for drug
treatment,” which would now deduct nine points, as a “dynamic” factor, given that an
inmate’s lack of need for drug treatment is presumably historical by the time he or she
is assessed for PATTERN purposes. As noted, inmates who did need drug treatment and
received residential treatment can deduct six points under the revised PATTERN tool.
192 The Updated Report does not provide an explanation for why the points deducted
or added under PATTERN changed in the updated version, but the risk-level cutoffs
remained at the same level as in the original PATTERN tool.
193 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 37. If an inmate has been infraction free for
more than twelve months, he has zero points added to his PATTERN score. If he has had
an infraction in the past seven to twelve months, he has one point added. If he has had
an infraction in the past three to six months, he has two points added. If he has had an
infraction in the past three months, he has three points added. There is no opportunity
to actually deduct points under this factor.
194 JUNE REPORT, supra note 81, at 2.
195 Id. at 2–3. The same report notes that there were also thousands of inmates
whose scores decreased. Almost no information is given about the demographics of
these inmates, however, or why the change to the risk-level cutoff scores was necessary,
nor why it was not publicly released for months.
196 For example, under the original tool, inmates could deduct twelve points for
completing eleven or more programs. FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 54. In the
revised tool, they can deduct only eight points for participating in eleven or more
programs. UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 38.

CYPHERT (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

11/5/2020 2:44 PM

REPROGRAMMING RECIDIVISM

365

The preceding paragraphs use the terms “in theory,” “theoretically,” and
“hypothetical,” and they use them with good reason. Although
PATTERN’s inclusion of dynamic factors is a step in the right direction,
it is at present a hollow gesture in light of current inmates’ actual ability
(or, more accurately, nonability) to earn deductions. Advocates have
criticized the BOP for its lack of educational and rehabilitative
programming, and even when the programming exists, inmates face
“long wait lists” before they can access it.197 Indeed, in the NACDL’s FOIA
request about PATTERN, they seek specific information on BOP
waitlists, “including numbers of offenders on each waitlist and time
periods remaining on such waitlist by program and location.”198 As
David Patton, the Executive Director of the Federal Defenders of New
York, expressed to Congress in his testimony, even though the First Step
Act “relies heavily on the BOP offering substantially increased
programming and productive activities for incarcerated individuals . . .
the BOP has failed to provide adequate programming to meet current
needs, much less the increased demand that will be required to make
the FSA a success.”199 The DOJ chose to develop the risk assessment
portion of the risk and needs assessment tool before developing the
needs assessment portion. That is a decision that vastly undercuts the
tool’s ability to properly weigh dynamic factors.
When the DOJ publicly released the information about the
PATTERN tool, it acknowledged that it fulfilled the “risk” portion of the
risk and needs assessment but had not yet fulfilled the “needs”
portion.200 The DOJ has reported that it will be relying initially on the
197

Rachel Anspach, How the First Step Act Got People Out of Prison and Back With
Their Families, MIC (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.mic.com/p/how-the-first-step-actgot-people-out-of-prison-back-with-their-families-19629720 (quoting David Booth,
deputy executive director of Black & Pink, an LGBTQ prison abolition organization, as
saying, “[t]he BOP historically has long wait lists and inadequate programming . . . I’m
afraid [PATTERN is] going to create a lot more problems and hurdles down the road”).
198 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Norman Reimer, Executive
Director of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
199 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of David E. Patton, Executive
Director, Federal Defenders of New York). Patton went on to note that “[t]he true extent
of the deficit is not known because the BOP has not been transparent about the number
of programs offered, the capacity of these programs, and the length of the waitlists for
these programs.” Id.
200 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 64 n.3 (“As presently developed,
PATTERN does not currently include a needs assessment component. . . . [T]he BOP will
continue to use its current needs assessment system, which is being modified and
enhanced at the time of this writing. The BOP’s needs assessment system will continue
to be developed and enhanced over the coming months.”); see also Oversight Hearing,
supra note 32 (statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate Deputy Attorney General)
(“The prototype needs assessment system is expected to be available for testing by the
second quarter of 2020.”).
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existing needs assessment the BOP implements, but that assessment is
inadequate by nearly any measure.201 For example, according to a 2019
report from the BOP, the wait list for literacy programs is approximately
16,000 people long.202 When Congress first considered the First Step
Act, the BOP and government labor unions expressed concern that
facilities were already understaffed and, therefore, lacked adequate
programming.203 The DOJ said that it anticipated having additional
needs programming by the second quarter of 2020.204 The First Step
Act, however, required that the DOJ complete the initial risk-level
assessment for each inmate in a BOP facility before that, by January
2020.205 Therefore, inmates were assessed by a PATTERN tool that took
into account things like the employment and education opportunities
they take advantage of, even though many of those inmates were held in
facilities with limited to no education or employment opportunities.206
201 See Julie Samuels, Nancy La Vigne, & Chelsea Thomson, Next Steps in Federal
Corrections Reform: Implementing and Building on the First Step Act, 32 FED. SENT. REP.
92, 92 (2019) (noting that the BOP has been “characterized by dangerous overcrowding,
escalating costs, and insufficient programming and services to prepare people for law
abiding lives after release”); see also NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89
(statement of Laura Mate on behalf of the Sentencing Resource Counsel Project, Federal
Public and Community Defenders) (“There is significant evidence that current programs
are inadequate to satisfy the congressional mandates in the First Step Act.”). The DOJ
appears to dispute this conclusion, at least in the First Step Act Report. See FIRST STEP
ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 61 (“BOP has a strong needs assessment process in place
to match inmates with programs to address their criminogenic needs.”).
202 NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of Antoine Prince
Albert III on behalf of The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights and The
Leadership Conference Education Fund) (citing U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PRISON
SYSTEM FY 2019 PERFORMANCE BUDGET, CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION, SALARIES AND EXPENSES 27
(2019), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1034421/download). But see UPDATED
REPORT, supra note 79, at 18 (noting that the term “waitlist” may not mean the same thing
in BOP reports and that “[t]he vast majority of Bureau programs do not have capacityrelated constraints”).
203 See NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of Brandon L.
Garrett and Megan T. Stevenson) (“During the consideration of the Act, the American
Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, and Council of Prison Locals called for
sentencing reforms, but raised the concern as to the use of risk assessment, that federal
prisoners are suffering from ‘sustained cuts’ to staffing levels, which reduces access to
rehabilitative programming.”).
204 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate
Deputy Attorney General) (“The prototype needs assessment system is expected to be
available for testing by the second quarter of 2020.”); FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra
note 55, at 78 (“The prototype system addressing [the needs assessment] is expected to
be available for testing by the second quarter of 2020.”).
205 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 83 (“Importantly, the Department will
meet the FSA’s requirement to assess all BOP prisoners by January 2020.”).
206 Several commentators have criticized the amount of policymaking that the First
Step Act delegated to the BOP. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of
David E. Patton, Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York) (“As a result of the
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Further, even once DOJ develops the needs assessment, the BOP
only plans on rolling it out for the first year in eight facilities.207 Only
after assessing this rollout and validating any results will the needs
assessment be introduced to the remaining 106 BOP facilities, with no
definite timetable given for completion of that process.208 In the
Updated Report, the DOJ claims that the BOP has already begun the
process of expanding its programming and hiring staff, and notes that
the First Step Act calls for $75 million per year in implementation
funding.209 It remains to be seen if the BOP will be willing and able to
prioritize that money on recidivism reduction programming.210
3. Weight of Static versus Dynamic Factors in PATTERN
Even assuming the BOP could properly fund and implement such
programming, PATTERN still disproportionately weighs static features
over dynamic ones.211 In the Updated Report, the DOJ said that it had
considered “assigning more weight to dynamic factors” but did not
ultimately do so because it tested the updated PATTERN tool “to ensure
that individuals could successfully move from a higher to a lower risk
score.”212 The DOJ provided several examples in Attachment A to the
Updated Report that it claimed demonstrated “how different types of
inmates can use the dynamic factors in the updated PATTERN to lower
their risk score.”213 What the eight examples in Attachment A actually
show, however, is something different.
Act, the BOP will now establish and implement a risk and needs assessment system that
will directly determine how long tens of thousands of people serve in prison. If not done
wisely, there are countless ways the system will result in unfair, biased, and overly
punitive outcomes. With history as a guide, this committee should be very concerned
about whether the BOP will rise to the challenge of these new responsibilities.”).
207 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 79 (“To collect a sufficient amount of data
for evaluation purposes, identify issues and trends, and conduct a preliminary
assessment of effectiveness, BOP plans to test the system using eight facilities, across
four security levels and six regions, for twelve months.”).
208 Id. (“After testing has been conducted and the results validated, BOP will
implement the final system and begin rolling it out to the remaining 114 BOP sites.”).
209 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 21–22.
210 The June Report notes that “April 6, 2020, DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs
announced nearly $70 million in
grants to support successful reentry.” JUNE REPORT, supra note 81, at 5. If these grants
have been awarded as of the date of this Article, that information does not appear to be
public, and so this Article is unable to assess their likely impact.
211 See Brennan Center letter, supra note 95, describing the original PATTERN tool
(“PATTERN appears to under-value dynamic factors related to rehabilitation . . . . Taken
together, the balance of factors seems to reflect an over-reliance on static factors and an
under-valuing of rehabilitative factors.”).
212 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 11–12.
213 Id.

CYPHERT (DO NOT DELETE)

368

11/5/2020 2:42 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:331

The eight examples look at a male and female version of four
inmate archetypes: “young drug offender taking multiple programs,”
“‘average’ released inmate,” “aging career criminal,” and “white collar
offender.”214 For each of the examples, the Updated Report assesses
how the inmate’s risk score would change under three different
scenarios: first, if they were a “model” inmate (one who took advantage
of nearly all programmatic and educational opportunities and avoided
any infractions while incarcerated); second, if they were a “noncompliant” inmate (one who did not take advantage of programmatic
and educational opportunities and who had infractions while
incarcerated); and third, if they were a “mixed” inmate (participated in
some programming but not all that is offered and had some infractions,
though less serious ones).215
The point of the examples is obviously to illustrate that dynamic
factors have weight and inmates control their destinies under
PATTERN—if you are a model inmate, you will have the ability to earn
an earlier release. But it really shows that the factor that makes the most
difference in reducing most inmates’ scores under PATTERN is that they
will inevitably age, rather than anything that inmates themselves can
control. For example, in the very first example provided in the Updated
Report, a twenty-five-year-old male drug offender who is a “model”
inmate and takes advantage of every single educational, rehabilitative,
or professional program offered can reduce his score from a fifty-seven
to a twenty-one, a reduction of thirty-six points.216 But this reduction is
not due solely to dynamic factors. Instead, fourteen points of the thirtysix, nearly forty percent, are awarded simply because the inmate aged
from one bracket into another.
Indeed, the fourteen-point reduction awarded for “aging” is the
largest deduction the inmate earns, dwarfing points deducted for
earning a GED (four points), completing drug treatment (six points),
completing a work program (two points), avoiding any violent
infractions (two points), and completing eleven or more programs
(eight points).217 In order to get the fourteen-point aging reduction, our
twenty-five-year-old inmate, who only had a five-year sentence to begin
with, would have had to reach the minimum age of twenty-nine and
therefore be incarcerated for at least four years of his five-year
sentence.218 Indeed, because the revised PATTERN tool’s “age at time of
214
215
216
217
218

Id. at 27–34.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id.
UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at App. II, p.37.
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assessment” factor has age brackets that range up to ten years,219 many
inmates could serve their entire sentences without ever “aging out” of
the age bracket they entered PATTERN in and thus never receive any
“aging” deductions. Despite this, the fourteen-point deduction for
“aging” is the largest in any of the eight examples provided in the
Updated Report. Because aging is not a proper “dynamic factor,” these
examples do not provide evidence for the argument that PATTERN
properly weighs dynamic factors.
Including dynamic factors in the PATTERN tool was a good first
step. But for this inclusion to be meaningful, PATTERNS’s developers
should reconsider the weighting of the dynamic factors or, at the very
least, should explain and justify them, and much more work needs to be
done to give inmates a real chance to access and complete antirecidivism programming.
C. Seeking Input from Experts and Stakeholder Groups
In developing PATTERN, the DOJ and the PATTERN developers
sought the input of experts in the field of risk assessment, stakeholder
organizations, and the public at large. The DOJ announced a
commitment to refining and recalibrating PATTERN over time, both as
a result of public feedback as well as the result of the initial classification
of BOP inmates. For example, one DOJ official testified before Congress
in October 2019 that the Department has continued to consult with the
Independent Review Committee (IRC) outside experts “to consider
ways to improve PATTERN,” noting that this improvement “is an
ongoing process, and [the DOJ] looks forward to refining the [risk and
needs assessment system] over time.”220 Further, in the First Step Act
Report, the DOJ committed to data review and tool reassessment before
using PATTERN to assess any individual inmate.221 The DOJ has also
requested bids from outside experts who would assess PATTERN and

219

Id. at 37 (including age ranges between 40–50 and 50–60).
Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate
Deputy Attorney General).
221 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 70 (“After reviewing the input, we will
reassess the tool, make any appropriate changes, and begin the process of assessing each
individual inmate.”).
220
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offer recommendations.222 Recalibration is a best practice223 and
therefore a laudable goal. Seeking public input is also an important best
practice, and the DOJ deserves to be commended for it. Of course,
seeking public input is one thing; embracing it and implementing it is
another.
1. Statutory Requirements
As explained above, in developing PATTERN, the DOJ contracted
with two researchers with prior experience in risk assessment as well
as published scholarship on the topic, Dr. Duwe and Dr. Hamilton.224 As
required by the First Step Act, the NIJ named a six-person IRC that
included members with peer-reviewed scholarship about risk
prediction and members with prior experience implementing and
assessing risk assessment systems.225 It appears that the IRC took a
relatively robust role in the review of PATTERN, as the DOJ claims that
the tool developers spent “more than 100 hours addressing questions
and concerns raised by the IRC” after PATTERN’s initial release.226 The
DOJ claimed that the IRC’s recommendations “helped confirm DOJ’s
confidence in the accuracy of PATTERN,”227 though it also acknowledged

222

The June Report notes that “On February 10, 2020, the Department released a
competitive funding opportunity to hire outside consultants to review and revalidate
PATTERN on an annual basis for up to five years. The deadline for submitting
submissions was April 24, 2020. The peer review process is underway.” JUNE REPORT,
supra note 81, at 3.
223 See Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 33 (“States should require regular repetition of
validity studies and develop procedures to make appropriate alterations based on any
changes in the population or new information that emerges about these tools.”).
224 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (Statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate
Deputy Attorney General) (“In developing PATTERN, the Department contracted with
two national experts in risk assessment systems—Dr. Grant Duwe, the Director of
Research for the Minnesota Department of Corrections, and Dr. Zachary Hamilton, an
Associate Professor of Criminal Justice and Criminology and the Director of the
Washington State Institute for Criminal Justice.”).
225 The Act was fairly prescriptive about the composition of the IRC, requiring that
the NIJ “appoint not fewer than 6 members to the Independent Review Committee,” and
that “all [IRC members] have expertise in risk and needs assessment systems and shall
include (1) 2 individuals who have published peer-reviewed scholarship about risk and
needs assessments in both corrections and community settings; (2) 2 corrections
practitioners who have developed and implemented a risk assessment tool in a
corrections system or in a community supervision setting, including 1 with prior
experience working within the Bureau of Prisons; and (3) 1 individual with expertise in
assessing risk assessment implementation.” First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391,
§ 107(c)–(d), 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
226 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 2.
227 Id.
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that it did not adopt all of the IRC’s recommendations for updating the
tool.228
Per the Act’s requirements, the NIJ also selected a “nonpartisan and
nonprofit organization with expertise in the study and development of
risk and needs assessment tools to host the Independent Review
Committee,”229 the nonpartisan Hudson Institute.230 DOJ officials
testified before Congress that the Hudson Institute “took no institutional
position on the First Step Act at any time, and . . . [that the NIJ] select[ed]
. . . the most qualified group of criminal justice experts . . . to advise the
Attorney General.”231
2. Listening Sessions and Congressional Testimony
The DOJ also sought feedback from stakeholder organizations as
well as the public at large during PATTERN’s development.232 The
Department held three listening sessions in April and May of 2019.233
Those who submitted written and/or oral comments included
attorneys representing the Federal Defenders office,234 members of
organizations ranging from the Heritage Foundation to the ACLU,235 and
criminal justice reform organizations.236
After the PATTERN tool was announced, the DOJ continued to seek
input on the tool, commencing a forty-five-day “public study period”
during which “the public [would] be able to review the System and

228

Id.
First Step Act § 107(b).
230 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Dr. John P. Walters, Member,
First Step Act Independent Review Committee) (“In April 2019, the National Institute of
Justice awarded Hudson Institute a contract to serve as host organization for the
Independent Review Committee specified by Title I of the First Step Act of 2018.”); see
also FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 9–10.
231 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Dr. John P. Walters, Member, First
Step Act Independent Review Committee).
232 Id. (noting that June of 2019, “the IRC solicited recommendations, concerns, and
priorities for further research from nearly eighty-five expert, external organizations and
individuals concerned with criminal justice, victims’ rights, and law enforcement.”).
233 Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate
Deputy Attorney General) (“The Department also held three listening sessions in April
and May of 2019 to allow stakeholders to provide input regarding the [risk and needs
assessment system].”).
234 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 15.
235 Id. at 16.
236 Id. at 15–16; see also Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Antoinette T.
Bacon, Associate Deputy Attorney General) (“The Department received written and inperson statements from 27 individuals representing a variety of communities, including
legal experts, law enforcement, criminal justice advocates, academics, victims’ rights
advocates, and others.”).
229
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consider ways in which it may be improved.”237 The DOJ specifically
invited and said it would welcome comment on the dynamic factors
chosen for inclusion in the PATTERN tool.238 As part of that public
comment period, NIJ hosted two more listening sessions where eight
“stakeholder organizations” provided input and feedback and another
eight submitted written comments.239 At the end of that public study
period, DOJ officials familiar with the creation of PATTERN testified
before the House Oversight Committee, alongside representatives from
a variety of organizations and academics.
In seeking input from interested organizations, the DOJ took a step
toward one of the advocates’ goals: public participation in the
development of recidivism prediction tools. One academic has argued
that for recidivism risk prediction tools to be more fair, these tools
“must reflect the values of the communities where the tools are
applied,”240 and that “[o]nly the communities affected by the tools can
voice those values.”241 She concludes that “public notice and comment
on normative decisions throughout the development process [of
recidivism prediction tools] would resolve many” issues such as
fairness, bias, and accountability.242 In the written statement the ABA
submitted as part of NIJ’s listening sessions on PATTERN, President
Judy Perry Martinez applauded the DOJ’s “commitment to public
engagement,” noting that such engagement “may strengthen public
confidence in the assessments that PATTERN renders.”243

237

FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 70; see also Oversight Hearing, supra
note 32 (Statement of Antoinette T. Bacon, Associate Deputy Attorney General) (“In
announcing PATTERN, the Department made clear that it was only the first step in
implementing the Act. Indeed, as part of PATTERN’s announcement, the Department
immediately began the process of considering how to improve it. That process included
a 45-day public study period that recently concluded.”).
238 See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 64 n.10 (“During the 45-day public
study period discussed in Chapter 4, the Department welcomes input on what changes
to these variables may increase predictability.”).
239 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 3. The NIJ compiled all of the statements from
the September 2019 listening sessions into a report. See NIJ LISTENING SESSION
STATEMENTS, supra note 89. The eight “in-person” comments came from academics and
representatives of organizations including the Sentencing Project, the Federal Public
and Community Defenders, and the Charles Koch Institute. Id. Written statements came
from, among others, a victims’ rights group, Deloitte Consulting LLP, and the American
Bar Association. Id.
240 Eaglin, supra note 93, at 105.
241 Id. at 108.
242 Id. at 109.
243 NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (Aug. 16, 2019 letter from Judy
Perry Martinez, President of the ABA, to Attorney General William Barr).
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Of course, for public participation to be meaningful, the DOJ had to
not only solicit the feedback on PATTERN but also take it seriously. In
the Updated Report the DOJ issued in January of 2020 announcing
certain changes to PATTERN, the Department claimed that it had “taken
the feedback [it received] seriously and considered the various and, at
times, competing views presented.”244
Notwithstanding these
assurances, many stakeholder groups have expressed frustration that
the DOJ has not taken their input seriously enough. For example,
victims’ rights groups expressed frustration that PATTERN reflected a
“lack of regard for victims” as well as a failure to listen to the input they
had previously provided.245
Certain criticisms of PATTERN have made for strange bedfellows.
In his written statement to the NIJ after their September 2019 listening
session, the General Counsel for the American Conservative Union
Foundation remarked upon the diversity of the organizations calling for
changes to PATTERN:
It is worth noting that groups on the right (FreedomWorks
and Stand Together), left (ACLU, the Leadership Conference
on Civil and Human Rights, and #Cut50), and center (US
Justice Action Network and National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers) voiced similar concerns about the current
iteration of PATTERN. In an era of polarized politics, the fact
that these voices are unified underscores the compelling need
for changes to the risk assessment tool.246
But there is also evidence that the PATTERN developers did listen
to some of the public comments they received and have already
reengineered the tool to reflect that feedback. For example, the Brennan
Center made a compelling argument about the lack of emphasis on
dynamic factors in the original PATTERN tool by pointing out the
relative weights that the tool placed on whether someone voluntarily
244

UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 1.
NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of Prof. Mary Graw
Leary on behalf of the Victims Advisory Group, United States Sentencing Commission)
(“[T]he V.A.G. was disappointed with the lack of regard for victims and a failure to utilize
the input previously provided by victim groups who addressed this body in May.”); see
also NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of Bridgette Stumpf on
behalf of Network for Victim Recovery of DC) (“[W]e are gravely disappointed by the
absence of any substantive mention or consideration of crime victims and their rights”
in the First Step Act Report.). In its Updated Report, the DOJ reaffirmed its commitment
to victims’ rights. See UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 17 (“DOJ will continue to engage
and communicate with organizations that represent crime victims as it works to fully
implement PATTERN, the forthcoming needs assessment, and other provisions of the
FSA.”).
246 NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement of David H. Safavian on
behalf of American Conservative Union Foundation).
245
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surrendered versus on someone’s participation in recidivism reduction
programming:
Tellingly, for men, whether the person surrendered to federal
custody, a static factor, counts for 12 points—as much as
completing more than 10 recidivism reduction programs.
Postsentencing voluntary surrenders, the only type that
PATTERN appears to score, are rare, occurring in only 25
percent of the diagnostic sample. Worse, our understanding is
that such surrenders occur most frequently in cases
presenting special circumstances or involving affluent
defendants. PATTERN should value rehabilitation above
access and privilege.247
In January of 2020, the DOJ announced that the PATTERN tool
would no longer consider whether an inmate had voluntarily
surrendered because it “removed or changed certain measures that
might be associated with bias, especially racial bias, in order to
implement the most fair and predictive tool possible.”248 The DOJ also
removed the factor that considered an inmate’s age at their first
arrest/conviction for the same reason.249
These changes, and the announcement that they are made as a
direct result of feedback, would be more welcome if PATTERN had not
been simultaneously changed, without explanation, to make it even
harder for certain inmates to initially score in the low or minimum risk
level.250
Further, there is a long list of issues raised and
recommendations made by advocates after the initial release of the tool
that the Updated Report dismisses. For example, despite receiving
multiple requests to release the dataset they used to develop PATTERN
and to make public additional information about the tool’s development,
the Updated Report declines to do so, instead saying they will give

247

Brennan Center letter, supra note 95, at 6. The Brennan Center further pointed
out that in the original PATTERN tool, “[p]articipation in prison education programs,
which is proven to reduce recidivism, is barely scored, and not scored at all for men.” Id.
The updated PATTERN tool does allow men to earn point deductions for educational
attainment, though those deductions remain smaller than the deductions available for
female inmates. See UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 39.
248 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 9.
249 Id. But see supra note 189, explaining that PATTERN was revised to increase the
points assigned for other static factors and to decrease the points that could be earned
as deductions.
250 As explained above, the Updated Report removed voluntary surrender and age at
first arrest as factors at the same time that the tool was recalibrated to increase the total
points for static features like age at time of assessment and decrease the point
deductions for dynamic factors like participation in prison programming. Further, the
risk-level cutoff points were lowered without any meaningful explanation.

CYPHERT (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

11/5/2020 2:44 PM

REPROGRAMMING RECIDIVISM

375

certain researchers a limited opportunity to review the data.251
Likewise, despite several calls to narrow the broad definition of
recidivism they adopted, the DOJ defended its original definition.252
Finally, despite numerous criticism of the use of AUC to assess accuracy,
much of which is discussed below, the DOJ does not even address that
issue in its Updated Report.
D. Issues with AUC and an Overall Focus on “Accuracy”
In developing PATTERN, the DOJ has seemed especially
preoccupied with establishing that the tool is “accurate” and has
favorable predictive reliability.253 The PATTERN developers repeatedly
tout the original tool’s AUC score in the First Step Act Report, and their
willingness to recalibrate the tool seems to be constrained in part by a
fear of making any changes that result in too great a reduction to the
AUC score. For example, in the Updated Report, the DOJ announced that
removing certain factors from PATTERN “reduce[d] PATTERN’s
predictive accuracy by approximately one percent,” but that it “viewed
this decrease as acceptable, if it prevents the actual or perceived
perpetuation of any bias.”254 Further, the only explanation given for the
decision to lower the risk-level cutoff levels was that doing so
“ensure[d] that inmates were accurately placed in the appropriate Risk
Level Category and the tool achieved the same high-level of predictive
accuracy.”255
1. Accuracy Is Not a Straightforward Goal
Although this hyper-focus on accuracy is understandable,256 it is
problematic for several reasons, especially given the conflation in the
PATTERN reports of accuracy as meaning a higher AUC score. First,
accuracy cannot be the only goal of a recidivism prediction tool, and
“may need to yield to other important goals, such as differential validity,
group fairness, and individual rights.”257 Further, accuracy is not a
251

See supra notes 157, 160 and 161 and accompanying text.
See UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 13; see also supra note 96.
253 “In crafting the System, the Department worked to make the benefits of the FSA
as widely available as possible without compromising predictive reliability.” FIRST STEP
ACT REPORT, supra note 55 (Letter from William Barr, Attorney General).
254 UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 9.
255 June Report, supra note 81, at 2.
256 “Risk tool developers have a natural incentive to focus on overall accuracy.”
Oversight Hearing, supra note 32 (letter attached to statement of David E. Patton,
Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York).
257 Id. Mr. Patton goes on to note that “[s]electing the right tradeoff between these
sometimes competing goals are more rightly within the power of policymakers and
stakeholders.”
252
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simple target, and developers make important decisions in even
defining what accuracy means. For example, is it more important that
PATTERN have high specificity (which measures the algorithm’s
accuracy among the true negatives—people “who are not ultimately
rearrested”) or that it have high sensitivity (which “measures the
algorithm’s accuracy among the true positives—people who are
ultimately rearrested”)? Put another way, do we care more about
avoiding false positives (falsely classifying an inmate as likely to
reoffend) or false negatives (falsely classifying an inmate as unlikely to
reoffend)?258 Algorithms like PATTERN will have to contend with
Blackstone’s ratio—”it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that
one innocent suffer”259—just as judges throughout time have.
Algorithms can be designed to achieve one definition of accuracy or
parity, but not all of them at the same time.260
2. AUC Is a Weak Proxy for Accuracy
Even if accuracy were a simple or straightforward goal, using AUC
to assess it is not without risk and criticism. As noted above, AUC for
PATTERN is best thought of as a measure of how often someone who
reoffended was placed in a higher risk category than someone who did
not. Although that information is valuable, it is not a complete picture
of “accuracy” by any means.261 For example, an AUC score cannot tell us
if the chosen risk-level cutoffs are well calibrated because “[p]redictive
accuracy measures like the AUC value provide no insight into whether
the cut-off points located between high, medium, and low recidivism
risk categories accurately calibrate with actual outcomes in the real
world.”262 In other words, while the AUC can tell us something about
how well PATTERN distinguishes recidivists from non-recidivists, it

258

For a more fulsome discussion of specificity versus sensitivity, see Mayson, supra
note 99, at 2243–45.
259 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1743 (William Draper
Lewis ed., Rees Welsh & Co. 1902) (1765).
260 Mayson, supra note 99, at 2248 (“An algorithm can be designed to achieve any one
of the above metrics of output equality, but not all of them together. That is, an algorithm
cannot be designed to achieve ‘total fairness.’”); see also Richard Berk et al., Fairness in
Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art 1 (Univ. Pa. Working Paper
No. 2017-1.0, 2017) (arguing that “there are at least six kinds of fairness, some of which
are incompatible with one another and with accuracy”).
261 See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 32, at 4 (statement of Prof. Melissa
Hamilton) (“[T]he AUC has serious limitations and thus cannot present a holistic portrait
of a tool’s abilities.”).
262 Eaglin, supra note 93, at 91; see also Hopkinson, supra note 128, at 742 (“[I]n
statistics, there is no consensus as to which AUC scores represent small, moderate, or
large effect sizes.”).

CYPHERT (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

11/5/2020 2:44 PM

REPROGRAMMING RECIDIVISM

377

cannot tell us very much at all about how accurately the tool will be able
to predict future recidivism.263 An AUC score cannot even tell us
whether the majority of errors PATTERN makes are false positives or
false negatives.264
With all of the potential problems involved in using AUC as a proxy
for accuracy, it is not surprising that even Dr. Hamilton and Dr. Duwe,
the outside consultants hired to develop PATTERN, have themselves
written about AUC’s limitations in their prior publications.265 This
makes the decision to declare the tool “validated” by using AUC values
all the more puzzling.266 Because AUC can be so confusing, many
laypeople (and even some researchers) incorrectly conclude that AUC is
a measure of how well a tool predicts recidivism, and thus that an AUC
score of .8 means that a tool is right 80% of the time about whether or
not someone reoffends. It does not mean anything remotely close to
that. Rather, as explained above, it means that 80% of the time, the tool
will classify someone who does end up reoffending as being in a higher
risk category than someone who does not.
3. Racial Disparities in PATTERN
The DOJ does not just use AUC to support its argument that
PATTERN is “validated”; it also uses it to counter arguments that
PATTERN is racially biased. As noted above, PATTERN’s developers
used the calculated AUC scores to bolster the conclusion that there is
“minimal” racial or ethnic disparity with respect to PATTERN’s
predictive value,267 and that “the PATTERN instrument’s predictive
performance is unbiased across racial and ethnic classifications.”268
Several advocates, however, have challenged that conclusion. In a letter
to the NIJ on behalf of the Brennan Center, Ames Grawert pointed out
that
263 For more on the issue of discrimination (distinguishing those who reoffend from
those who do not) versus calibration (“how accurate the tool statistically estimates
recidivism”), and why AUC is a better measure of discrimination, see Oversight Hearing,
supra note 32, at 4 (statement of Prof. Melissa Hamilton).
264 Id.
265 See id. at 5 (citing to previous studies published by Drs. Duwe and Hamilton that
noted that AUC validation is “rather easily achieved” and not something that should be
given great weight or solely relied upon to assess accuracy).
266 FIRST STEP ACT REPORT, supra note 55, at 84 (“PATTERN was developed using a
seven-year dataset of BOP releases, and it was validated as an effective predictor of
recidivism over the inmates’ subsequent three-year period in the community.”).
267 Id. at 60 (“Overall, these findings indicate strong and comparable prediction
strength for PATTERN models across all race/ ethnicity categories, suggesting minimal
racial/ethnic disparity for PATTERN’s prediction strength.”).
268 Id. at 63.
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PATTERN identified more than half of all Black men (53
percent) in the diagnostic sample as having a high risk of
recidivism, compared to 29 percent of white men. Indeed, the
plurality of white men (30 percent) were classified as
“minimum risk”; just 7 percent of Black men received the
same classification.269
Racial disparities like this are not necessarily surprising in light of the
fact that PATTERN was developed from a BOP dataset, and therefore
any historical racial disparities in our criminal justice system. For
instance, issues like Black defendants being given longer sentences for
the same underlying crime than white defendants270 or Black people
having higher arrest rates for drug use than white people—despite
having similar underlying drug usage rates271—are codified in the
data.272 Even if PATTERN was designed to be racially neutral, the fact
that it relies on data that is not racially neutral means it will produce
racially disproportionate results.
After the original release of the PATTERN tool, advocates
suggested ameliorating this racial bias by eliminating or reducing
PATTERN’s reliance on an inmate’s criminal history in calculating a risk
score.273 In response to these criticisms and suggestions, the Updated
269

Brennan Center letter, supra note 95.
See, e.g., UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN
SENTENCING:
AN UPDATE TO THE 2012 BOOKER REPORT (Nov. 2017) (concluding that Black men received
sentences on average 19.1 percent longer than similarly situated white men during the
four-year period that was studied).
271 Brennan Center letter, supra note 95 (“Due to historical discrimination and
enforcement patterns, Black men and women may have longer criminal records than
their white counterparts despite similar offending patterns. Blacks are
disproportionately arrested for drug offenses, for example, despite using drugs at rates
similar to whites.”); see also NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS, supra note 89 (statement
of Antoine Prince Albert III on behalf of The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human
Rights) (“Fourth, NIJ’s claim that PATTERN’s ‘predictive performance is unbiased across
racial and ethnic classifications’ ignores historical and enduring patterns of racial bias
and discrimination that infect the data upon which PATTERN relies.”).
272 See, e.g., Mayson, supra note 99, at 2251 (“Any form of prediction that relies on
data about the past will produce racial disparity if the past data shows the event that we
aspire to predict—the target variable—occurring with unequal frequency across racial
groups.”).
273 See, e.g., Brennan Center letter, supra note 95 (“PATTERN could be designed to
incorporate criminal history in a novel way, by discounting the impact of drug
convictions. Better yet, it could exclude arrest records entirely when ‘scoring’ someone’s
criminal history, for the reasons stated in the previous section, and focus solely on a
person’s history of conviction and incarceration.”); Oversight Hearing, supra note 32
(statement of Prof. Melissa Hamilton) (suggesting that researchers use the PATTERN
dataset to determine if the criminal history factor accounts for most of the racial
disparity, and if so, that “modifying criminal history in risk-sensitive ways may improve
the tool and its equitable outcomes.”).
270
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Report points once again to PATTERN’s AUC scores and claims that
these establish that PATTERN is a “neutral assessment tool.”274 The DOJ
further says, without explaining why, that “[t]he risk assessment tool
cannot correct for any outside biases that lead to higher recidivism.”275
4. More Accurate Than What?
A more proper way of assessing the accuracy and fairness of
PATTERN may not be to ask, “Is it fair?” but to ask, “Is it fair as opposed
to the alternatives?” Is PATTERN better at predicting recidivism, and
doing so in a fair way, than are judges or probation officers? There is
some evidence that algorithmic recidivism prediction tools do
outperform the “unaided clinical judgment” of people, even trained
professionals.276 Some academics have argued that even where a
recidivism prediction tool like PATTERN may produce biased results,
“the default alternative—subjective risk assessment—is very likely to
be worse.”277 Nonetheless, if PATTERN can be improved in ways that
minimize racial bias without reducing its accuracy, as many
commentators have suggested it can,278 the DOJ must consider those
improvements.
E. Unclear Opportunities to Appeal/Challenge
It is not entirely clear at this point where the information the
PATTERN tool uses to assess each new inmate will come from, but the
most likely source seems to be the Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”) that the United States Probation Office completes for each
federal criminal defendant who has pleaded or been found guilty.279
274

UPDATED REPORT, supra note 79, at 9.
Id.
276 See, e.g., Goel et al., supra note 99, at 2–4 (noting that algorithms tend to
outperform human judgment, even criminal justice professionals’ judgment, when it
comes to predicting recidivism); Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 11–12 (discussing how
many academics “argue that actuarial assessment, which is at work in risk-assessment
algorithms, is preferable to clinical assessment,” and that “studies have generally
credited greater accuracy and predictive validity to the objectivity of actuarial tools
compared to the theoretical nature professional clinical judgment”).
277 Mayson, supra note 99, at 2277–78 n.208–09.
278 See supra note 273.
279 The First Step Act Report explains how a PSR is created. See FIRST STEP ACT REPORT,
supra note 55, at 91 n.15 (“Prior to sentencing, the probation officer will interview the
defendant and conduct an investigation to provide the sentencing judge with pertinent
information relevant for sentencing. This information is captured in a Presentence
Investigation Report and includes details of the defendant’s family history, community
ties, education background, employment history and physical and mental health.”).
Other portions of that Report suggest that the PSR is where much of the PATTERN data
would come from. See id. at 75 (“BOP has held preliminary discussions with the United
275
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Although this may be an obvious choice for populating data for
PATTERN, it is not one without problems. First, if the information in the
PSR is incorrect, the inmate will face “great difficulty” trying to have it
corrected.280 This is because “[t]he sentencing court does not have
jurisdiction to correct the PSR after sentencing, thus creating a
‘jurisdictional obstacle’ for the inmate.”281 Of course, an inmate might
not even know that the information in his or her PSR was incorrect, as
some parts may be considered “confidential” and kept from the
defendant and his or her counsel.282 Finally, sentencing information like
the PSR is admitted into evidence under the lower “preponderance of
the evidence” standard, and so the PSR can include hearsay.283
Wherever the PATTERN information comes from, it appears that
an inmate has only one opportunity to challenge or “appeal” if the risk
score the algorithm assigns to him or her places them outside of the
“minimal” or “low” range: through a warden override.284 There are
several reasons a warden may decline to provide such an override. First,
States Probation Office about supplementing the Presentence Investigation Report with
more detailed education information about learning needs.”). Deloitte Consulting LLP,
which has done previous consulting work for the DOJ, recommended at one of the
listening sessions that prison staff “use information in the presentence report to
populate data in PATTERN and the needs assessment.” NIJ LISTENING SESSION STATEMENTS,
supra note 89 (statement of Deloitte Consulting LLP).
280 Gregory W. Carman & Tamar Harutunian, Fairness at the Time of Sentencing: The
Accuracy of the
Presentence Report, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 7 (2004).
281 Id.
282 Kehl et al., supra note 30, at 15 (“Although the information in the PSI is generally
made available to the defendant or his counsel as well, certain information or parts of
the report the report may be considered confidential and kept from the defendant.”).
283 Noel L. Hillman, The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of Recidivism,
58 JUDGES J. 36, 37 (2019) (noting that “while the process [of creating the PSR] is largely
transparent with input from the defendant and counsel, the officer obtains the
information through ex parte interviews of third parties and a review of documents
often containing multiple layers of hearsay”).
284 See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 102(g)(1)(D), 132 Stat. 5194
(2018), which provides that an inmate, even one who has not been labeled low or
minimal risk by PATTERN, may petition the warden “to be transferred to prerelease
custody or supervised release” and that the warden may approve such a petition “after
the warden’s determination that—the prisoner would not be a danger to society if
transferred to prerelease custody or supervised release; the prisoner has made a good
faith effort to lower their recidivism risk through participation in recidivism reduction
programs or productive activities; and the prisoner is unlikely to recidivate[.]”
Advocates have urged the DOJ and BOP to consider having another, independent appeals
process for inmates to challenge their PATTERN score. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra
note 32 (statement of Prof. Melissa Hamilton) (“A stand-alone mechanism for disputing
risk scores must be established. The current plan appears to be to simply apply the
current prisoner grievance system. This is insufficient and inapplicable. Algorithmic risk
assessment practices require their own processes to challenge.”).
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the “anchoring effect” of knowing that a seemingly neutral and objective
algorithm has declared an inmate at a higher likelihood of recidivism
may give many wardens pause.285 Second, any individual warden may
be hesitant to approve an early release for fear of negative publicity if
the inmate does reoffend. Finally, wardens may introduce their own
biases into the system through such an override286—biases that
algorithmic systems are theoretically designed to protect against.
V. CONCLUSION
The First Step Act is just that—a first step, one which is necessary
but not sufficient. The Act carries with it the opportunity for truly
meaningful criminal justice reform, and it has made some exciting
progress. The PATTERN tool includes certain best practices in
recidivism prediction, and its developers have made a good faith effort
to engage advocates and scholars about the tool’s development. But
much remains to be done if PATTERN is to truly represent an advance
in algorithmic recidivism prediction. The DOJ must release more
information about PATTERN and its underlying datasets so that
scholars, advocates, and community members can truly assess the tool
and offer responses for improving it.

285

For more on “anchoring effect” research with respect to recidivism prediction
tools, see Liu et al., supra note 32, at 130 (noting that there is a “psychological ‘anchoring
effect’ for courts using scientific and technological tools,” and that “numerous studies
have demonstrated how judges (and human individuals) are submissive to computergenerated numbers and results that may further frame and condition the view of
judges”); see also Cyphert, supra note 31 (“Laypeople without technical expertise can be
especially vulnerable to placing too much faith in algorithmic outcomes.”).
286 Goel et al., supra note 99, at 15 (“[A]s illustrated by Part I’s discussion of how
professional ‘overrides’ of actuarial estimates can backfire, it could well reintroduce the
bias that instruments are designed to prevent.”).

